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ABSTRACT
NETWORK EFFECTS AND DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEMS
BY
YUKUN YANG
July 13th, 2021
Committee Chair:

Dr. Likoebe Maruping

Major Academic Unit:

Computer Information Systems

The emergence and increasing adoption of blockchain technologies give rise to a new form of digital platform-enabled
ecosystems – decentralized ecosystems. In such ecosystems, multi-side participants collectively enjoy the decisionmaking rights instead of a central authority orchestrating the overall ecosystem. To understand decentralized
ecosystems, this dissertation explores public blockchain ecosystems from two perspectives. First, from the perspective
of value co-creation, the first section of this dissertation investigates how interdependent activities enable the
functioning of such a non-central authority environment. Second, from the perspective of governance, the second
section of this dissertation explores the mechanisms that are enacted to exercise decentralized governance and the
impacts of these mechanisms. This dissertation presents a layer-subsystem structure and reveals dynamic and
coevolving interactions within and between subsystems across layers. This dissertation also identifies three decision
mechanisms and demonstrates the dynamic influences of the mechanisms on other activities at each layer and the
interaction between mechanisms across layers.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
BRIEF BACKGROUND AND OVERARCHING OBJECTIVE
Digital platform-enabled ecosystems have drawn much attention in the past decade
(Alves et al. 2017; Huber et al. 2017; Schreieck et al. 2016; Wang 2021; Wareham et al. 2014).
In these ecosystems, there is usually a central firm (i.e., digital platform owner) that sponsors the
core components and interface upon which complementors can develop and offer their
complementary products to end-users (Pereira et al. 2019). Decentralized ecosystems supported
by blockchain technologies have become popular in recent years. A key feature of such
ecosystems is a lack of central authority in control of overall orchestration. Ecosystem
participants can take part in decision-making and represent their perspectives (Chen et al. 2021).
The primary purpose of these ecosystems is to maximize the overall welfare of all participants
rather than the residual profits of the platform owner (Chen et al. 2021).
With the platform owner’s intermediation in centralized ecosystems, exchanges between
transacting parties become self-reinforcing in the form of network effects—where valuable
exchanges attract additional value-creating exchanges among participants involved (Cennamo
and Santalo 2013; McIntyre and Srinivasan 2017). Blockchain technologies challenge the
existing enforcement mechanisms that platform owners typically leverage to govern the
ecosystem (Schmeiss et al. 2019). Existing research has focused on ecosystems with clearly
defined and centralized forms of authority. In contrast, there is a lack of understanding about
blockchain technology’s ability to encourage network effects in environments with decentralized
forms of authority (Chen et al. 2021; Wu et al. 2019). The first section of this dissertation aims to
understand how network effects generated from value co-creation activities shape a healthy
blockchain ecosystem.
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In a centralized ecosystem, the platform owner has the overarching power over designing
and applying appropriate governance mechanisms and orchestrate the innovation process. Such
governance is referred to as centralized governance. Although centralized governance benefits
the platform owner in having exclusive governance control and acquiring the most benefits from
innovation processes, it may expose the ecosystem to significant risks such as lack of
transparency, corruption, regulatory capture, and misuse of power (Atzori 2015; Rietveld et al.
2020). The decentralized governance enabled by blockchain technologies can reduce the
concentration of power and achieve automation, transparency, auditability, and costeffectiveness (Atzori 2015). However, the extant literature on ecosystem governance has tended
to place a greater emphasis on centralized forms. Less attention has been paid to decentralized
governance regarding what governance mechanisms are enacted and how these mechanisms
would affect the activities in the ecosystem. The second section of the dissertation aims to
identify specific governance mechanisms in public blockchain ecosystems and explore the
impacts of these governance mechanisms.
Based on the overarching objectives, this dissertation is divided into two sections
presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Based on the results of the two sections, I draw a
conclusion in Chapter 4. Below I briefly introduce each of the two sections.
SECTION 1
Existing research on platform-enabled ecosystems has placed a great deal of emphasis on
platforms with centralized forms of authority while paying less attention to ones with highly
decentralized forms. To uncover the functioning of decentralized platform-enabled ecosystems, I
introduce layer-subsystem as an important structure of the public blockchain ecosystem.
Informed by the theoretical perspective of value co-creation, I theorize how activities within each
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subsystem react to each other with distinct value co-creation processes and how subsystems
interact at the same layer or across different layers. I collect weekly data of a leading public
blockchain ecosystem and use a time-series analysis to examine the hypotheses. My findings
reveal that network effects in the public blockchain ecosystem are unbalanced (mutual vs.
unidirectional) and asymmetric (short-term vs. long-term). I also find that the within-subsystem
network effects tend to manifest immediately, while those that are between subsystems or across
layers usually take time to manifest.
SECTION 2
Based on the findings from the first section, this section specifically focuses on the
decentralized governance perspective. Built on Fama and Jensen’s (1983) framework of decision
processes in organizations, I conceptualize the decision control mechanism and decision
management mechanism and contextualize these governance mechanisms to the layered structure
of the public blockchain ecosystem. I examine the dynamic influences of specific governance
mechanisms on participants’ activities within and across different layers and the interactions
between different governance mechanisms. A time-series analysis is conducted using weekly
data collected from a leading public blockchain ecosystem. My findings indicate that the
decision control mechanism dynamically affects activities at the application layer, and the two
decision management mechanisms dynamically affect activities at the architecture layer. The
results also show a significant effect of the decision control mechanism on a decision
management mechanism across layers.
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CHAPTER 2. NETWORK EFFECTS IN PUBLIC BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEMS: A
LAYER-SUBSYSTEM PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
In a digital platform-enabled ecosystem, the platform functions as an intermediary with
policies and mechanisms through which platform owners exert influence over participants on
multiple sides of ongoing exchange transactions and coordinate operations in the ecosystem
(Parker and Van Alstyne 2005; Song et al. 2018). In this process, the platform owner plays a
critical role in encouraging exchanges between transacting parties. In addition to designing and
implementing mechanisms and toolkits to support participants (Parker and Van Alstyne 2018), as
a trusted third party the platform owner also defines and enforces the rules of exchange
(Constantinides et al. 2018; Maruping and Yang 2020). A core value proposition of digital
platforms is that, with the platform owner’s intermediation, exchanges between transacting
parties become self-reinforcing in the form of network effects—where valuable exchanges attract
additional value-creating exchanges among participants involved (Cennamo and Santalo 2013;
McIntyre and Srinivasan 2017).
Existing research on platform-enabled ecosystems and their enablement of network
effects has placed a great deal of emphasis on platforms with clearly defined and centralized
forms of authority (Rietveld et al. 2019). The primary purpose of governing a relatively
centralized digital platform is for the platform owner to lead stakeholders to create value
(Boudreau 2010; Kyprianou 2018; Rietveld et al. 2019). As such, the ability to achieve network
effects tends to be tied to actions taken by the platform owner. For example, Song et al. (2018)
found that the platform owner’s control over app review time and platform update frequency can
moderate the dynamic network effects between users and app developers. From a theoretical
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perspective, we know far less about the mechanism behind the emergence of network effects in
digital platforms where authority is more decentralized in nature (Chen et al. 2021). In recent
years, the emergence of blockchain technology that supports digital platforms for exchange has
raised questions about the ability to encourage network effects in environments with
decentralized forms of authority (Wu et al. 2019). On the one hand, blockchain technology
provides architecture support for highly decentralized ecosystem governance. On the other hand,
it challenges the existing enforcement mechanisms that platform owners typically leverage to
govern the ecosystem, as there may be no platform owner in such an ecosystem. As a result,
another question it raises is the ecosystem structure that congeals to enable these network effects.
Along a continuum ranging from publicly accessible at one extreme to highly restricted
accessibility at the other extreme, blockchain ecosystems can be categorized into three types:
public blockchain ecosystems, consortium blockchain ecosystems, and private blockchain
ecosystems (Beck et al. 2018; Zheng et al. 2017). The governance of consortium and private
blockchain platforms is more centralized as they have an authority that controls the access and
consensus process. In contrast, decentralized authority is well-represented in public blockchain
platforms (Atzori 2015). As my research interest lies in highly decentralized ecosystems, I
specifically focus on public blockchain in this research. This represents a theoretically significant
and novel context for theorizing about network effects. If network effects are contingent on the
actions of a centralized platform owner, how might they materialize under conditions of
decentralized authority? Extant platform literature is limited in providing a compelling
explanation with regard to this question.
To establish some conceptual structure for theorizing about decentralized digital platform
ecosystems, this research introduces layer-subsystem as an important structure of public
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blockchain ecosystems. I conceive of this structure of blockchain ecosystems along two key
attributes. The first attribute is that they are comprised of a layered architecture. Drawing upon
Adomavicius et al. (2008) and Yoo et al.’s (2010) conception of layered architecture, I view
public blockchain ecosystems as comprising an assemblage of technology components that
collectively enable the platform ecosystem to function. The second attribute is that they are
comprised of different subsystems of mutually dependent participants. Through this lens of
subsystems, I view the blockchain ecosystem as comprising an assemblage of multiple selfcontained communities, each with its own set of participants and incentives that facilitate valuecreating exchanges at a given layer of the architecture. This layer-subsystem conceptual lens
enables us to illuminate the network effect dynamics in decentralized platform-enabled
ecosystems.
I suggest that the layer-subsystem structure surfaces the importance of alignment of
participant incentives not only within subsystems at the same layer but also between subsystems
at or across layers to ensure a robust platform-enabled ecosystem. An absence of such alignment
risks a downward spiral of value erosion as the tension between what is desirable within a
subsystem versus what is desirable for adjacent subsystems in the broader ecosystem falls out of
balance. In light of the layer-subsystem structure, I then theorize the exchange dynamics that
facilitate network effects in the public blockchain ecosystem. Drawing on the theoretical lens of
value co-creation, I posit that the network effects generated by dynamic interactions between
activities in the layer-subsystem structure of a public blockchain ecosystem vary in their nature
(direct vs. indirect) and in the duration of their effects (short-term vs. long-term). Specifically, I
argue that the network effects within subsystems are direct and can immediately manifest. I also
argue that the network effects between subsystems are indirect and can be short-term or long-
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term within layers but are more likely to be long-term between subsystems across layers. I
empirically examine the hypotheses using weekly time-series data collected from Ethereum and
its repository on GitHub between January 2016 and October 2019. Using a vector autoregression
with exogenous variable (VARX) analysis, I examine the dynamics between activities within and
between subsystems across different layers.
This research contributes to the platform-enabled ecosystems literature by elucidating
previously underexplored ecosystems with a highly decentralized form of governance. With the
growing trend of adopting blockchain technologies, it is vital to understand how a platformenabled ecosystem functions without the intermediation of a central authority. Prior work has
primarily emphasized the interactions within a single digital platform as a self-contained
community (e.g., Cennamo and Santalo 2013; Song et al. 2018; Tiwana et al. 2010). By
developing a subsystem view of a decentralized digital platform-enabled ecosystem, I draw
attention to the need for a stronger emphasis on alignment of incentives and rewards within and
between subsystems in the ecosystem. My approach also recognizes that the subsystems do not
necessarily exist at the same layer of a digital platform. By conceptualizing a layer view, I
provide new insight into the different time horizons over which network effects manifest.
Specifically, I find that cross-layer network effects are indirect and long term, while within-layer
network effects are more short term. Overall, decomposing the ecosystem into layers and
subsystems reveals how value co-creation activities interrelate and coevolve in a complex
environment. These findings also generate important practical implications as to how the
management of public blockchain ecosystems can be improved.
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BACKGROUND
Digital Platform-enabled Ecosystems
Drawing from views in biology, the term ecosystem is generally understood as “a set of
actors with varying degrees of multilateral, non-generic complementarities that are not fully
hierarchically controlled” (Jacobides et al. 2018, p. 2264). Depending on the unit of analysis,
empirical studies on ecosystems are grouped into streams—business ecosystems, innovation
ecosystems, and platform ecosystems (Jacobides et al. 2018). In a digital platform-enabled
ecosystem, the platform serves as the meeting space that enables value-creating interactions
between participants by acting as an intermediary that provides mechanisms and toolkits to
support participants (Kim 2017; Parker and Van Alstyne 2018) and being a trusted third party to
resolve conflicts during the innovation process (Constantinides et al. 2018; Maruping and Yang
2020). Research in this stream has a focus on firm-sponsored platforms, and the relevant
activities all take place on a single platform (Adner 2017; Jacobides et al. 2018). In these studies,
a platform ecosystem usually consists of a focal firm (i.e., the platform owner or sponsor) and its
network of complementors (e.g., app developers, API developers, data aggregators, and thirdparty service providers) that produce complements to enhance platform value (Adner and Kapoor
2010; Ceccagnoli et al. 2012; McIntyre and Srinivasan 2017). Discussions in this literature
revolve around how different parties in the platform ecosystem interact to create value and how
the platform acts as an intermediary to facilitate interactions (Grover and Kohli 2012; McIntyre
and Srinivasan 2017). For example, Ceccagnoli et al. (2012) find that participation in an
ecosystem partnership of a major platform owner can improve the business performance of small
independent software vendors (as complementors to the platform ecosystem). Parker et al. (2017)
show that platform firms can optimize their intellectual property, thereby creating highly
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valuable complements for ecosystem users. Rietveld et al. (2019) illustrate that a platform
sponsor can manage ecosystem value by selectively promoting individual complements, which
nurtures the success of complements and influences end users’ perception of the breadth and
depth of the ecosystem. These and other studies mainly focus on platform-enabled ecosystems in
which platform owners retain authority and are the main arbiters of exchanges between
participants. In contrast, much less is known about ecosystems where such authority is
distributed to participants rather than being vested in a central authority, limiting the conclusions
drawn from extant views (Wang 2021).
Mounting evidence shows decentralized forms of governance as a key feature of thriving
blockchain technologies (Wu et al. 2019). Although blockchain technology has started to attract
researchers’ attention, emerging studies tend to focus on firm-sponsored platforms enabled by
blockchain. Consequently, rather than understanding a platform-enabled ecosystem embedded
with a highly decentralized mechanism, such approaches reinforce existing orthodoxy
surrounding the need for and role of a central authority (Chen et al. 2021; Schmeiss et al. 2019).
In the next section, I introduce blockchain technology, public blockchain ecosystems and its
decentralized form of organizing.
Public Blockchain Ecosystems
The notion of blockchain was first proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 and
implemented in Bitcoin, a public transaction ledger of cryptocurrency (Nakamoto 2008). At its
core, blockchain technology is a distributed public ledger upon which all transaction information
between parties is recorded in a chain of blocks (Yli-Huumo et al. 2016). This chain grows as
more blocks of new transactions are appended to it continuously (Zheng et al. 2017). There are
four key characteristics of blockchain that pave the foundation for decentralized governance
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(Zheng et al. 2017). (1) Non-intermediary: blockchain enables transactions to be validated
without the intervention of a central trusted agency (e.g., Federal Reserve Bank); (2) Immutable:
once blocks are added to the blockchain, it is nearly impossible for the transactions to be deleted
or rolled back; (3) Anonymous: participants do not need to reveal their real identities in order to
participate in blockchain activities; and (4) Trackable: all transactions can be easily verified and
tracked as each block has a unique hash value that points to the previous block.
There are generally three types of blockchain and they differ with regard to the level of
accessibility they offer to general participants (Beck et al. 2018; Zheng et al. 2017). Public
blockchain (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum) opens all transaction records to the public and allows
everyone to participate in the process of block validation. Consortium blockchain (e.g.,
Hyperledger) allows pre-selected participants to engage in the process of block validation.
Private blockchain (e.g., Ripple) allows only participants that are preregistered by a central
authority to read blockchain data and submit new transactions. Compared to the governance of
public blockchains which is characterized as permissionless and highly decentralized, the
governance of consortium blockchains is more centralized as the right to verify transactions is
decided by a central authority (Atzori 2015). The governance of private blockchain is even more
centralized as a single authority has complete control over the accessibility and verification
rights to the blockchain. As already noted, I focus on the public blockchain as it best reflects the
core value proposition of blockchain—a distributed public ledger that enables two or more
parties to exchange value without having an intermediary in control of the transactions (Angelis
and da Silva 2019; Yli-Huumo et al. 2016). Despite variations among blockchain ecosystems,
major participants in a blockchain ecosystem include users who transact with other users or
invoke smart contracts, contract creators who deploy smart contracts on the blockchain
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platform, miners who validate the transactions and smart contract deployment, and protocol
developers who develop and improve the underlying blockchain protocol to support on-platform
activities.
In this research, I adopt Adner’s (2017) view of ecosystem-as-structure and adapt it to the
public blockchain ecosystem. Ecosystem-as-structure emphasizes interactions between
participants and views ecosystems as configurations of activity defined by a value proposition.
Therefore, in order to understand the functioning of decentralized ecosystems, it is critical to
investigate the localized activity configurations and understand how the activities interact to
serve the value proposition. The distinct feature that separates the public blockchain ecosystem
from other centralized ecosystems is that the value proposition is no longer orchestrated by a
focal firm but is implicitly shared by participants in the ecosystem and reflected in alignment of
their incentives. Actors in a platform-enabled ecosystem may have different motivations to
participate. However, they should have a mutual agreement regarding their roles and the
configuration of activities in the overall ecosystem (Adner 2017). When their incentives are
aligned, they will collaborate to co-create value to spur the overall ecosystem performance.
Otherwise, the overall ecosystem may risk falling apart.
In the theoretical development section, I will first elaborate on network effects as an
indicator of incentive alignment and discuss how it manifests from value co-creation. Then,
building on the view of ecosystem-as-structure, I will introduce layer-subsystem as the structure
to understand the localized activity configuration and their dynamic relationships in a public
blockchain ecosystem.
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THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Network Effects and Value Co-creation
As a fundamental premise of the interaction network in an ecosystem and an indicator of
the alignment of participants’ incentives, a network effect manifests when participants place a
higher value on platforms with a larger number of other participants due to the greater potential
value that can be derived from interacting with them (Cennamo and Santalo 2013; McIntyre and
Srinivasan 2017). With aligned incentives, a participant may value direct connections with other
participants with whom they can interact (direct network effects), or they may anticipate that
platforms with more participants will also offer a wider variety of complementary products and
services (indirect network effects) (Cennamo and Santalo 2013). The existing literature has
demonstrated that the interactions between participants are influenced by network effects and
facilitated by platform intermediaries (McIntyre and Srinivasan 2017). In this study, I
specifically focus on network effects in terms of the number of activities rather than the number
of unique participants for the following two reasons. First, recent literature suggests that network
effects are not all about size but are also determined by the nature of network value and the value
creation and capture process (Afuah 2013). From this standpoint, value-creating activity is key to
understanding network effects. Second, participants in the ecosystem experience network effects
through the number of ongoing activities. The blockchain transaction tracking platforms (e.g.,
Etherscan) usually display the number of activities that are ongoing on the blockchain platform.
Participants can perceive the ecosystem’s value based on the available information about
ongoing activities.
In the ecosystem of a two-sided digital platform, value is created from the dynamic
interactions between the two sides of participants. Although value creation is a critical
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mechanism for participation in platform-enabled ecosystems, there is a lack of reasoning about
what value is created and how value is created in such ecosystems. For example, some studies
implicitly state that value is created from the products developed by complementors (e.g., Adner
and Kapoor 2010; Rietveld et al. 2019). Some argue that value is generated by the platform
owner when they implement strategies to spur innovative activities (e.g., Parker et al. 2017).
Others posit that value is co-created by the platform owner and complementors (e.g., Parker and
Alstyne 2008). An exception is Song et al. (2018), who draw on the value creation perspective
by Bowman and Ambrosini (2000), and decompose the value created by app developers and
users into use value and exchange value. Users perceive the use value of complements (Lepak et
al. 2007). Users use the platform to try complements when the innovative complements that
extend the platform’s functionality are available on the platform (Adner and Kapoor 2010;
Ceccagnoli et al. 2012). Complementors realize the exchange value when users purchase the
complements (Lepak et al. 2007; Song et al. 2018). As such, positive network effects are
expected in a healthy two-sided platform ecosystem. When the ecosystem is not at its best
performance, the platform owner can always exert governance power to orchestrate the
interactions. For example, the platform owner can adjust the ecosystem openness to influence the
success of complements (Parker et al. 2017).
In a multi-sided platform-enabled ecosystem, there are more than two types of
participants, and the dynamics of network effects are more complex than the mere existence of
positive network effects on a single digital platform (Afuah 2013; Boudreau and Jeppesen 2015;
McIntyre and Srinivasan 2017). For example, some participants may not engage in on-platform
activities but still contribute to the functioning of the overall ecosystem. Also, for ecosystems
without central orchestration by platform owners, participants need to figure out how to
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cooperate to create value in a manner that satisfies each party’s needs, and the ecosystem
functions as a structure that aligns the interdependencies and coordinates the interactions at the
levels of both the parts (e.g., participants) and the whole (e.g., ecosystem). In a recent article,
Wang (2021) draws on an ecology lens of holon and holarchy and proposes an information
ecology theory to direct future studies on investigating the part-whole relations in digital
innovation ecosystems. Wang (2021) emphasizes the importance of understanding how the
effects of autonomous participants are integrated into a coherent whole and what role do digital
technologies play in this integration. To better understand the dynamic interactions in an
ecosystem, I decompose the ecosystem into smaller components to understand how each
component works and how the components interrelate to each other and contribute to the whole
ecosystem.
Layer-Subsystem Structure
A vital feature of the digital platform that makes it distinct from traditional forms of
organizations is modularity—an attribute which derives from the modular structure of
technology products. Adomavicius et al. (2007) describe modules as subsystems of product
components that provide firms more flexibility in product design and manufacturing. Firms have
become increasingly dependent on the use of modules to handle increasing complexity of
products (Baldwin et al. 2000). Tiwana et al. (2010) apply modularity to a digital platform
context. They define a module as an add-on software subsystem that adds functionality to the
platform (e.g., Firefox extensions) and modularity as the degree to which changes within a
subsystem do not create a ripple effect in the behavior of other parts of the ecosystem. Modules
are loosely coupled so that they can independently evolve, unconstrained by having to coordinate
or having to know internal details of other modules (Tiwana et al. 2010).
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Yoo et al. (2010) combine the modular architecture of a physical product and the layered
architecture of digital technology and proposed a layered modular architecture as a hybrid
architecture. A layered architecture of digital technology enables separation between device and
service and the separation between network and content (Adomavicius et al. 2008), while a
modular architecture allows a physical product to be decomposed into loosely coupled
components that are interconnected through prespecified interfaces (Baldwin and Clark 2000).
The layered modular architecture emphasizes the structure from a technical standpoint and
depicts a continuum that enables innovations to spring up independently at any layer through
loose couplings across layers (Adomavicius et al. 2008; Yoo et al. 2010).
Although Schilling (2000) points out that increasing modularity is not limited to products
but can be applied in many different kinds of systems, previous platform ecosystem studies tend
to emphasize modularity from a technology perspective. A related notion to module is
subsystem, which has been broadly used in the field of psychology (Briggs and Morgan 2017).
Different from the modular view that emphasizes the added functionality in terms of technology,
subsystems highlight the interrelationships in terms of self-regulation and value-adding to the
broader ecosystem. Entities in each subsystem define their own sets of rules as boundaries. These
boundaries not only define the membership of subsystems but also the rules of interaction
between those members. The boundaries of subsystems indicate that one subsystem is distinct
from the others, while still recognizing the interrelatedness between subsystems (Briggs and
Morgan 2017). Such subsystems allow an entity to exist in multiple subsystems simultaneously.
In such situations, the entity takes a critical role in connecting two subsystems. In Wang’s (2021)
notion of ecosystems as holons and holarchies, diverse entities involved in various types of
digital innovations may appear as holons at different levels of a “holarchy of digital innovation
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ecosystems” (Wang 2021, p. 402). Within an ecosystem, a digital innovation can manifest itself
at the level of parts where actors innovate interdependently and at the level of the whole where
the innovation is co-created as a result. An actor’s engagement with a digital innovation not only
helps the actor achieve its own goal, but is also conducive to other actors’ pursuit of their
respective goals (Wang 2021). Blockchain technology provides a decentralized way to
standardize the terms of interactions among participants, which facilitates the modular structure
of the ecosystem (Schmeiss et al. 2019).
Enlightened by the platform literature on layered and modular structures and blockchain
technology characteristics, I draw on a value co-creation perspective to conceptually divide
blockchain ecosystems into three subsystems that operate at two layers. Based on the
functionality that the layer aims to offer to the overall ecosystem, I decompose a blockchain
ecosystem into an application layer and an architecture layer. The application layer of a
blockchain ecosystem deals with application functionalities that directly serves participants as
they engage in exchange of digital assets, implementing smart contracts, and verifying
transactions on the blockchain platform. The architecture layer of a blockchain ecosystem
includes activities that contribute to designing, developing, and implementing the underlying
architecture of blockchain technologies, which is at the heart of value creation for participants at
the application layer (Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998). For participants at the application layer,
activities at the architecture layer create use value as the updates applied to the blockchain will
be directly used for activities at the application layer. Architecture-layer participants are more
likely to perceive the exchange value created from the activities at the application layer, as the
use of blockchain technologies will be translated into non-monetary value (e.g., reputation and
experience) that encourages activities at the architecture layer. Considering the distinct features
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that different layers add to the ecosystem, I state that the cross-layer interactions are mainly
indirect and delayed, as they usually happen on different interfaces of the ecosystem so that
changes may not be perceived by participants across layers immediately. In contrast, interactions
at the same layer can be direct or indirect, depending on the value creation and appropriation
process.
Although the common purpose of participants at the application layer is to use
blockchain, their incentives to participate can be different. The incentive structure is essential to
understanding participant behavior in a platform-enabled ecosystem as it influences the value
generated in the ecosystem from participants’ engagement and the formation of subsystem
boundaries (Constantinides et al. 2018). In a blockchain ecosystem with aligned incentives,
participants tend to choose actions that are consistent with the goal of the incentive structure,
thereby bringing greater value to the blockchain ecosystem (Beck et al. 2018). Based on
participants’ incentives and the value generated from their participation and interaction, I
identify two subsystems—the contract subsystem and exchange subsystem—as existing at the
application layer and one subsystem—the protocol subsystem—as existing at the architecture
layer. For participants in the exchange subsystem, activities in the contract subsystem offer smart
contracts available for use, thus generating use value to meet their needs. For participants in the
contract subsystem, activities in the exchange subsystem provide a potential market for them to
acquire monetary profits (i.e., exchange value). Table 1 summarizes the key participants and
activities in the blockchain subsystems that I have identified.
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TABLE 1
Layer-Subsystem Structure and Value Creation
Participant
Description
Contract Subsystem
Contract
Participants who create smart
Creators
contracts and deploy the smart
contracts on a blockchain.

Application Layer

Miners

Participants who verify blocks
of transactions and contracts
and keep complete records of
the transaction history.
Exchange Subsystem
Users
Participants who transfer
money (in cryptocurrencies) or
invoke smart contracts.

Architecture Layer

Miners

Participants who verify blocks
of transactions and contracts
and keep complete records of
the transaction history.
Protocol Subsystem
Protocol
Participants who create and
Developers
improve the underlying
blockchain protocol.

Activity
Smart Contract Deployment:
a transaction that is sent from
the contract creator with the
purpose of deploying a new
contract on the blockchain.
Mining: a validation process
to ensure a block of
transactions is valid before
adding it to the blockchain.

Value to Participant
•

Pecuniary: profits from
use of smart contracts

•

Pecuniary: monetary
rewards by validating
blocks

Transaction: a signed data
•
package that stores money or
a message sent from one
account to another. A
transaction can be made from •
a user to another user, or from
a user to a smart contract.

Mining: a validation process
to ensure a block of
transactions is valid before
adding it to the blockchain.

•

Protocol Development: code
•
contributions from developers
to develop and improve the
blockchain protocol.

Co-created Value
Available-for-use
products based on
smart contracts

Pecuniary: profits by
investing crypto
currencies; value
exchange
Non-pecuniary: using
smart contracts for noneconomic purpose such
as personal information
storage
Pecuniary: monetary
rewards by validating
blocks

Increased exchange
value of
cryptocurrency

Non-pecuniary:
blockchain development
skills; reputation

Improved blockchain
protocol

Activities and Participant Incentives in Layered Subsystems
Subsystem Activities at the Application Layer. Mining, contract deployment, and
transaction are three types of activity that can be performed at the application layer of the public
blockchain ecosystem. Specifically, as the overall purpose of the contract subsystem is
supporting the implementation of innovative products (i.e., smart contracts), it consists of
contract deployment—a process to request for smart contracts to be implemented on the
blockchain and mining—a validation process to ensure a block of transactions and smart
contracts are valid before being added to the blockchain. Exchange subsystem aims to ensure the
proper functioning of daily transactions on the blockchain, which includes mining and
transaction—an exchange process to transfer cryptocurrency or a message from one account to
another. It is noteworthy that the relational view allows subsystems to overlap such that actors
can participate in multiple subsystems simultaneously (Briggs and Morgan 2017). In the case of
blockchain, mining exists as a key activity in both the contract subsystem and the exchange
subsystem. Acting as an arbiter, miners verify transactions and smart contracts following the
protocol rules defined by the consensus algorithm (Zheng et al. 2017). For example, following
the “Proof of Work” consensus algorithm, miners compete to solve a computationally intensive
cryptographical puzzle in order to verify a new block (Beck et al. 2018; Cong et al. 2019). The
miner who first solves the puzzle can add the block to the blockchain and receive a reward. As
such, miners are motivated by the monetary rewards they will receive by successfully mining the
block. The higher the reward offered by the transaction sender (or contract creator) and the lower
the estimated cost of performing the validation, the more likely that the transaction (or contract
deployment) will be verified. In order to verify as many transactions as possible, miners invest
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heavily in advanced computational power and cooling systems to enhance their mining ability
(Zheng et al. 2017).
Contract deployment is the other type of activity in the contract subsystem. A smart
contract defines the rules and penalties around an agreement and automatically executes and
enforces the obligation in the contract without interference from third parties (Beck et al. 2018).
For example, a tenant can rent an apartment directly from a landlord through a smart contract
with an agreement on rental terms. When the rental ends, the smart contract triggers the payment
of the security deposit back to the tenant with an adjustment of charges for damage repair
(Karamitsos et al. 2018). Contract creators create a smart contract and request to deploy it on the
blockchain. Building on smart contracts, contract creators can further develop decentralized
applications (known as DApps). An example is CryptoKitties—a blockchain game which allows
players to breed and exchange virtual cats by using a smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain.
Contract creators earn a commission from users’ usage of smart contracts. The more usage of
their contracts, the greater revenue they can generate (Cai et al. 2018).
Besides mining, the exchange subsystem includes transaction as a core activity.
Transactions initiated by blockchain users serve two general purposes: user-to-user transactions
for monetary exchange between users and user-to-contract transactions for invoking the
functions of smart contracts. A transaction is a signed data package that stores cryptocurrency or
a message sent from one account to another. A user may send out a transaction with an amount
of cryptocurrency to another user for the purpose of exchanging monetary value or investment
(Konstantinidis et al. 2018). A user can also send out a transaction with a message or a certain
amount of money to a contract account for the purpose of making use of a smart contract (Syed
et al. 2019).
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Subsystem Activities at the Architecture Layer. The protocol subsystem at the
architecture layer aims to provide technical support for the functioning of the blockchain
platform. A blockchain protocol consists of the rules for validating and broadcasting blocks and
resolving conflicts (Syed et al. 2019). In an ecosystem without a central authority, the blockchain
protocol defines consensus algorithms as a decision-making mechanism to force participants to
achieve agreement. Protocol developers engage in protocol development, writing software code
and testing the underlying protocol to support the appropriate functioning of the blockchain.
Protocol development activities usually take place outside the blockchain platform. For instance,
Ethereum’s protocol is developed on GitHub—a leading open-source software development
platform. As resources in the public blockchain ecosystem are public and open, developers
voluntarily make code contributions. Protocol developers are motivated to continuously
contribute to the improvement of the blockchain protocol when they perceive that doing so can
help them enhance their development skills or establish and grow their reputation (von Krogh
and von Hippel 2006).
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Viewed through the lens of layer-subsystem structure, I posit that digital platformenabled ecosystems can be characterized by a complex set of direct and indirect value cocreation relationships between participants within subsystems and between subsystems at
different layers of the ecosystem architecture (Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998). Figure 1 conceptually
illustrates the research model. In this study, an immediate network effect refers to the case in
which the growth of activity on one side of an interaction triggers the growth of activity on the
other side in the first week after the change. A long-term network effect refers to cases in which
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the response in growth of one side of an interaction to the growth of the other side takes a longer
time to manifest.
FIGURE 1
Research Model

Contract Subsystem

Exchange Subsystem
H2a

Mining

H1a

H2b

H1b
H4b

Contract
Deployment

H5a

Transaction

H4a

H5b

Application Layer
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H3
Protocol
Development
Protocol Subsystem

Architecture Layer

Within-subsystem
interaction
Between-subsystem
interaction

Cross-side Effects within the Contract Subsystem
In the contract subsystem, contract deployment activities and mining activities
complement each other to generate value. Contract creators have capabilities to create innovative
smart contracts, while miners have resources and facilities to make the smart contracts effective.
The direct interaction between miners and contract creators enables them to co-create value by
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implementing innovative products (e.g., DApps) built on validated smart contracts. A growing
number of smart contracts that are pending verification provide increased rewards for miners.
Nevertheless, the increased rewards may not always translate into positive network effects.
Normally, miners’ activities are constrained by their mining ability as the verification process
requires an infrastructure that can support massive energy demand and sophisticated computing
operations (Zheng et al. 2017). Consequently, miners may have to upgrade their infrastructure to
acquire the profits from increased smart contracts. Upgrading such infrastructure usually takes
time. For example, miners may need to shut down their system for a while for the upgrade.
Therefore, I expect an immediate decrease in mining activities in the subsequent period. In the
long term, as the infrastructure upgrade eventually enhances mining ability, miners can conduct
more mining activities as a response to the growing contract deployment requests. As such, I
expect an increase of contract deployment leads to a growth in mining in the long term.
Hypothesis 1a. In the contract subsystem, contract deployment exhibits an immediate
negative effect and a long-term positive effect on mining.
For contract creators, increased mining activities can boost their confidence that smart
contracts will be verified in a timely manner. As contract creators are motivated by revenues
from successfully implemented smart contracts, growth in mining activity can attract more
contract creators to deploy new smart contracts on the blockchain, resulting in an expedited
accumulation of smart contracts that are available for use. I expect positive network effects to
manifest both immediately and in the long term after an increase in mining. In the short term,
because of the direct interaction between miners and contract creators, the enhanced mining
capability encourages contract creators to make decisions and roll out smart contracts on the
current blockchain platform. In the long term, increased mining activities indicate that the
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platform is capable of verifying a large number of contract deployment activities, which will
attract more smart contract deployment activities. As such, I hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 1b. In the contract subsystem, mining exhibits both immediate and long-term
positive effects on contract deployment.
Cross-side Effects within the Exchange Subsystem
Similar to the contract subsystem, transactions have to be verified by miners before they
become valid on the blockchain (Zheng et al. 2017), and miners in the exchange subsystem gain
monetary rewards through verifying transactions successfully. Mining activities and transaction
activities complement each other, in that miners and users co-create the exchange value of
cryptocurrencies or smart contracts. As in the case of the contract subsystem, constraints to
rapidly upgrade mining infrastructure suggest a short-term decrease and a longer-term increase in
mining in response to an increase in transaction volume.
Hypothesis 2a. In the exchange subsystem, transaction exhibits an immediate negative
effect and a long-term positive effect on mining.
Users engage in transactions for their need to exchange cryptocurrency, investment, or
other non-pecuniary objectives (e.g., voting, information storage). Because such exchanges may
happen with high frequency, users prefer for their transactions to be verified as quickly as
possible. A large number of mining activities indicates that transactions are more likely to be
verified in a timely manner, which motivates more blockchain usage by users. Because the
interactions between users and miners are direct, the increase in transaction in response to an
increase of mining will be immediate. In the long term, the growing verification capabilities
reflected in a growing number of mining activities sends a positive signal to users, which
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encourages more transactions. Therefore, I expect a positive long-term network effect from
mining to transaction. In sum, I hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 2b. In the exchange subsystem, mining exhibits both immediate and long-term
positive effects on transaction.
Same-side Effects within the Protocol Subsystem
As protocol development activities in a public blockchain ecosystem are voluntary and
open to the public, the more protocol development activities taken by previous developers, the
more knowledge with greater value is available for the subsequent developers to absorb. As such,
developers are more likely to perceive the development community as a more valuable place to
participate with the increased available resources they can use and professionals with whom they
can work (Cennamo and Santalo 2013). As such, I expect the development activities will
increase in the long term. In the short term, an increase of protocol development indicates that
developers are intensively working on solving issues (e.g., fixing code defects) and improving
the functionality of the protocol (e.g., adding new features). It may lead to an immediate
decrease of development activities in subsequent periods, as there are fewer tasks for developers
to perform. In sum, I hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 3. In the protocol subsystem, protocol development exhibits an immediate
negative effect and a long-term positive effect on protocol development.
Cross-subsystem Effects at the Application Layer
As mining activities complement both contract deployment activities and transaction
activities, the relationship between the contract subsystem and exchange subsystem mainly
manifests in the indirect network effects between contract deployment and transaction. Such
network effects have been observed in two-sided digital platforms that have been well studied in
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the platform literature. Specifically, users who make transactions are similar to customers on a
digital platform such as Apple’s App Store, and smart contracts are similar to software
applications developed by complementors (Cennamo and Santalo 2013). At the application layer
of a public blockchain ecosystem, users find the ecosystem to be a more valuable place to
participate when there are more smart contracts available for use as it offers a greater variety of
services (Parker et al. 2016). This value realization process is relatively simple and requires
many fewer resource commitments by users. As users do not need an extra value-creation
process to capture the use value of smart contracts, their responses do not have to be delayed
(Song et al. 2018). Therefore, I expect that an increase in smart contracts that are available for
use can attract more transaction activities immediately. In the long term, however, the indirect
network effect may be insignificant. The wear-out effect can be used to explain the quick decay
in the effectiveness of marketing-related actions over time (Bass et al. 2007) and is reflected in
two ways. First, accumulated smart contracts may cause issues with homogeneity. As there is a
lack of third-party coordination, the functionality of smart contracts tends to be homogenous
over time. Users may lose interest in trying new smart contracts and instead concentrate on the
ones that have built a good reputation. Second, the proliferation of new smart contracts may also
pose cognitive challenges for users to identify the smart contracts that fit their needs (Grime et
al. 2002). In sum, I hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 4a. The contract subsystem exhibits an immediate positive effect on the
exchange subsystem but no significant long-term effect.
Contract creators perceive the ecosystem as a more valuable place to participate as a large
number of transactions indicates more users who can potentially use their smart contracts (Song
et al. 2018). However, this positive indirect network effect may not manifest immediately. One
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reason is that creating a smart contract and successfully deploying it on the blockchain is a
process requiring significant resource commitment (Song et al. 2018). Contract creators need to
figure out the users’ underlying demand and offer an appropriate reward to miners for faster
verification, which makes the response of contract deployment less likely to take effect
immediately. Eventually, the positive indirect network effect from transaction to contract
deployment will emerge, but with a time lag. As such, I hypothesize,
Hypothesis 4b. The exchange subsystem exhibits a long-term positive effect on the
contract subsystem but no significant immediate effect.
Between-subsystem Effects Across Layers
Protocol developers collaboratively contribute to the blockchain protocol such as fixing
bugs and adding new features. At the subsystem level, the protocol subsystem serves the contract
subsystem and exchange subsystem in the way that protocol developers improve the blockchain
protocol to meet the participants’ needs at the application layer. At the participant level, the
engagement of contract creators and users is complemented by miners’ engagement and
influenced by protocol developers’ engagement. A smart contract is created based on the rules
specified in the blockchain protocol. Developers’ active and continuous code contributions on
the blockchain protocol can increase the protocol functionality, which meet the increasing need
of contract creators (Setia et al. 2012). Miners conduct transaction verification by following the
rules defined by the blockchain protocol. Increasing development can create a more stable
environment and enhance their experience of using blockchain, resulting in increased mining
activity (Song et al. 2018). Active and continuous code contributions on the blockchain protocol
indicates that active efforts have been aimed at enhancing the stability of the blockchain system,
which boosts users’ confidence of getting their transactions verified efficiently. However, the
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positive effects from the protocol subsystem to the contract subsystem and exchange subsystem
are more likely to manifest in the long term rather than immediately. An important reason is that
protocol developers usually have their own development pace and schedule to update the
changes to the blockchain protocol, while the participants at the application layer are more likely
to perceive the value of changes only after the release of a new version of the protocol.
Therefore, I hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 5a. The protocol subsystem exhibits a long-term positive effect on the
contract subsystem but no significant immediate effect.
Hypothesis 6a. The protocol subsystem exhibits a long-term positive effect on the
exchange subsystem but no significant immediate effect.
Protocol developers are motivated by non-pecuniary rewards such as improving their
protocol development skills and building a good reputation in blockchain communities. On the
one hand, a growth of activities in the contract subsystem and exchange subsystem indicates
greater participant interest and thus reveals greater value of the blockchain. Open source
developers are usually attracted to projects that garner greater user interest (Stewart et al. 2006).
Making important contributions to such a valuable blockchain ecosystem can bring them peer
recognition in the area of blockchain development. These can motivate protocol developers to
increasingly contribute to the blockchain protocol (Fjeldstad et al. 2012). On the other hand, an
increase in the use of blockchain in terms of deploying new contracts, making transactions, and
verifying blocks may generate more defect reports and feature requests, which offers more
opportunities for protocol developers to apply and hone their development skills, leading to an
increase of protocol development as well (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005). However, it takes time
for protocol developers to identify participant demands, go through these reports and requests,
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and make decisions on which ones to include in the next release of the blockchain protocol.
Further, the development capabilities of protocol developers are usually heterogeneous, which
may delay the development process as well. Therefore, it is less likely for the protocol subsystem
to quickly respond to an increase in the contract subsystem or exchange subsystem. In sum, I
hypothesize.
Hypothesis 5b. The contract subsystem exhibits a long-term positive effect on the
protocol subsystem but no significant immediate effect.
Hypothesis 6b. The exchange subsystem exhibits a long-term positive effect on the
protocol subsystem but no significant immediate effect.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Research Context
My empirical setting is Ethereum, one of the largest public blockchain platforms. As of
March 2020, Ethereum serves as the platform for over 260,000 smart contracts and almost 92
million users1. Ether is the cryptocurrency of Ethereum and is used for exchange between users
and as a reward to miners. Contract creators can use smart contracts to release their own digital
assets (known as tokens) and DApps. Ethereum adopts the POW consensus algorithm as the core
of its protocol. The development activities—including the software coding of the underlying
Ethereum protocol—take place on GitHub—one of the primary hosting sites for open-source
projects.
The Ethereum blockchain ecosystem is an ideal setting for my research objective for two
reasons. (1) The open-source feature makes Ethereum open to the public such that anyone can
participate in the transaction, mining, and contract deployment activities on the Ethereum

1

https://etherscan.io/tokens, accessed on July 30, 2020.
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platform as well as the protocol development activities on GitHub. (2) Ethereum is a public
blockchain, which means that all decision-making authority regarding the activities that happen
in the Ethereum ecosystem is distributed to participants.
Data and Measurement
I test my hypotheses using data from two sources—BigQuery and GitHub. I wrote
queries to collect all details about transactions, mining, and contract deployment activities on
Ethereum from an open dataset maintained by Google BigQuery. I also wrote scripts to collect
data on code contributions in go-ethereum—the repository for the Ethereum client (an
implementation of the Ethereum protocol) on GitHub. The time period for the data collected is
from Week 1 in 2016 to Week 43 in 2019 (199 weeks). I used data aggregated at the weekly
level because (1) weekly data provides sufficient variation and granularity to reveal ongoing
patterns of participant behavior on the blockchain, and (2) a weekly window is sufficient time to
observe cross-side exchange activity in a digital platform environment.
I measure transaction (TXN) as the total number of user-to-user transactions and user-tocontract transactions that occur in a particular week. To measure contract deployment (CD), I
count the accumulated number of smart contracts that have been successfully deployed on the
Ethereum blockchain in a particular week. In Ethereum, two different miners may generate the
same block simultaneously. In such cases, the block that has fewer follow-up POW consensus
from other participants becomes an uncle block. The uncle block miners also receive a smaller
amount of reward for their work. In addition, each block has a combination of transactions and
contract deployment activities. To reflect the actual number of total mining activities, I measure
mining (MN) as the total number of mining activities in terms of the transactions and smart
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contracts that are verified by miners successfully (in real blocks) and unsuccessfully (in uncle
blocks) in a particular week.
In GitHub, core developers contribute to the codebase by making commits (i.e., make
revisions on the base code directly), while peripheral developers make pull requests with the
improved code to be merged into the codebase (Yang and Boodraj 2020). In Ethereum’s protocol
repository, both types of contributions are voluntary in nature and equally crucial for protocol
development. I, therefore, measure protocol development (PD) as the total number of commits
which includes the contributions by core developers and admitted pull requests from peripheral
developers in a particular week.
I also include several control variables. The first one is ether price (EP), which reflects
the attractiveness of Ethereum and may influence participants’ engagement in activities. It is
measured using the average price of ether in a particular week. The second control variable is
mining difficulty (MD), which is measured using the average difficulty to validate a new block
on Ethereum in a particular week. Mining difficulty describes the average length of time that it
takes for a miner to solve the cryptographic puzzle. High mining difficulty indicates that
verifying a block requires greater computing power, which may discourage low-capacity miners
from joining the blockchain. The third control variable is version release (VR), which is
measured by the number of new versions of the blockchain client released in a particular week.
Participants may not perceive the changes in protocol unless a new version is released. The
fourth control variable is hard fork (HF), which represents whether a hard fork is executed in a
particular week. A hard fork happens when there are divergent opinions of major changes in the
blockchain protocol. I set HF to 0 if there is no hard fork in a given week, and 1 if there is a hard
fork. Table 2 shows the definitions and summary statistics of key variables. The average values
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over the observation period for contract deployment, mining, transaction, and protocol
development are 5,657,739 (unlogged value), 3,273,408 (unlogged value), 2,916,724 (unlogged
value), and 57.769 (unlogged value), respectively.
TABLE 2
Constructs, Measures, and Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Transaction
(TXN)
Contract
Deployment
(CD)
Mining (MINE)

Measurement
Number of user-to-user transactions and
user-to-contract transactions in week t
(log)
Accumulated number of smart contracts
deployed on Ethereum by week t (log)

Number of mining activities on
Ethereum in week t (log)
Protocol
Number of code contributions to
Development (PD) Ethereum protocol on GitHub in week t
(log)
Ether Price (EP)
Average ether price in week t (log)
Mining Difficulty
Average time for mining a new block in
(MD)
week t (log)
Version Release
Number of new versions of client are
(VR)
released in week t (log)
Hard Fork (HF)
Whether a hard fork is conducted in
week t
Notes: N = 199. Variables are logged.

Mean
14.27

S.D.
1.34

Min
11.29

Max
15.93

14.11

2.33

8.80

16.78

14.38

1.34

11.40

16.23

3.77

0.88

0.00

5.62

4.54
6.43

1.62
1.84

0.67
2.23

7.16
8.18

0.25

0.37

0.00

1.39

0.03

0.17

0.00

1.00

Model Specification and Estimation
As my data is time-series in nature, I employ vector autoregression with exogenous
variable (VARX) in my model estimation. This method allows us to capture both the short-term
and long-term dynamic interdependent relationships of different activities in a blockchain
ecosystem (Song et al. 2018). Consistent with prior research, I adopt a standard VARX
procedure (e.g., Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999; Song et al. 2018). To address skewness in the
distribution, I took the natural log of each of the endogenous variables adjusted by adding 1. I
use an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) to check stationarity. The basic VARX model
assumes a stationary time series process (Adomavicius et al. 2012). If the process is not
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stationary, de-trending of the data can be performed in several ways, among which differencing
the data is a commonly used method (Enders 1995; Lütkepohl 2013). With first-difference
values, the ADF tests of all endogenous variables reject the null hypothesis of a unit root and
suggest stationarity (as shown in Table 3). Therefore, I examine my models using the firstdifference values of variables. To determine the appropriate number of lags, I follow the
suggestions of the Akaike information criterion (AIC = -5.066) and final prediction error (FPE =
7.5e-0.8) and use the lag of five periods (weeks) as the optimal lag length. I conduct a series of
Granger causality tests to explore whether explanatory variables explain the variation of
dependent variables (as shown in Table 4). Granger causality is typically tested using Wald tests
of the null hypothesis that all coefficients of the corresponding lags are equal to zero (Enders
1995). The results show that there are several significant Granger-causal relationships in the
estimated model that reject the null hypothesis2.
TABLE 3
Unit Root Test Results after First Differences
Variables
Transaction
Contract Deployment
Mining
Protocol Development

Test Statistic
-16.909
-15.234
-12.969
-22.474

p-value
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

TABLE 4
Granger Causality Test (F Statistic)
Dependent Variables
CD
MN
TXN
PD
CD
–
7.533
5.545
14.520**
11.492**
–
62.304***
3.417
MN
1.059
21.039***
–
4.709
TXN
PD
14.004**
9.548*
8.390
23.257*
Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol
Development, respectively. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

2

For equations that have serial correlation or heteroscedasticity issues, the granger test results may not capture the
potential causal relationships accurately. In such cases, I refer to IRF graphs as more robust results.
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To have an in-depth understanding of how activities dynamically interact, I propose a
VARX model to examine each dynamic interaction as proposed in the hypotheses. I include an
intercept C, and a deterministic-trend variable T that captures the impact of the omitted,
gradually changing trend of the dependent variables. In the VARX model, ! is the index of the
week, " is the maximum number of lags, and # is a vector of white-noise disturbances with a
normal distribution of N(0, Σ). I also test the existence of serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey
Test) and heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan Test) and use Newey-West HAC Covariance
Matrix Estimation to address such issues (Newey and West 1987) (as shown in Table 5).
TABLE 5
Tests for Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity
Dependent Variable
Breusch-Godfrey Test
Transaction
6.932 (0.226)
Contract Deployment
4.814 (0.439)
Mining
11.663 (0.040)
Protocol Development
15.739 (0.008)
Notes: The results show !! values with p-values in parentheses.

Breusch-Pagan Test
0.460 (0.498)
477.850 (0.000)
1.090 (0.297)
0.99 (0.320)

The VARX specification given in Model (1) is used to capture dynamic interactions in
the public blockchain ecosystem. For the within-subsystem relationships, as an example, the
direct network effects within the contract subsystem are reflected in how mining (*+! ) changes
over time following a change in contract deployment (,-! ), and how contract deployment (,-! )
changes over time following a change in mining (*+! ). Regarding between-subsystem
relationships, for example, the indirect network effects between the contract subsystem and
exchange subsystem are reflected in the change in contract deployment (,-! ) following (and
leading to) a change in transaction (./+! ).
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The VARX analysis is supplemented with analyses of impulse response functions (IRFs),
allowing us to simulate the over-time impact of a change (or shock) to one variable (over its
baseline) on the dynamics of the full multi-equation system (Enders 1995). The VARX estimated
coefficients are not usually directly interpretable due to general multicollinearity issues
associated with including lagged terms (Sims 1980), so VARX analysis does not typically
discuss magnitudes of coefficients and focuses instead on Granger causality test and IRFs (Stock
and Watson 2001). Therefore, I report the IRFs results in Figure 2 and use them as the basis for
interpreting the results of the model estimation.
RESULTS
Main Results
My goal in this research was to identify the network effects emerging from activities
within each subsystem and the network effects between subsystems. If network effects are
indeed present, I expect that the endogenous variables will have dynamic interrelated
relationships. Table 4 reports the general estimation results (the estimated model coefficients can
be found in Appendix A). Figure 2 illustrates the impulse response functions. Results of the main
analysis are summarized in Table 6.
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FIGURE 2
Main Results—Impulse Response Functions
Network Effects in Contract Subsystem
Contract Deployment → Mining (H1a)

Mining → Contract Deployment (H1b)
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FIGURE 2 (Continued)
Main Results—Impulse Response Functions
Network Effects between Exchange Subsystem and Contract Subsystem
Contract Deployment → Transaction (H4a)

Transaction → Contract Deployment (H4b)
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TABLE 6
Results Summary of Main Analysis and Robustness Checks
Hypothesis

Main Analysis

Robustness Check
(New Contracts as CD)

Robustness Check
(Code Commits as PD)

Within-Subsystem Effects
H1a. In the contract subsystem,
contract deployment exhibits an
immediate negative effect and a
long-term positive effect on
mining.
H1b. In the contract subsystem,
mining exhibits both immediate
and long-term positive effects on
contract deployment.
H2a. In the exchange subsystem,
transaction exhibits an immediate
negative effect and a long-term
positive effect on mining.
H2b. In the exchange subsystem,
mining exhibits both immediate
and long-term positive effects on
transaction.
H3. In the protocol subsystem,
protocol development exhibits an
immediate negative effect and a
long-term positive effect on
protocol development.

Not support.
The effects of contract
deployment on mining are
dynamic and long term.

Not support.
There is no significant effect of
contract deployment on mining.

Not support.
The effects of contract
deployment on mining are long
term and negative.

Not support.
There is no significant effect of
mining on contract deployment.

Not support.
There is no significant effect of
mining on contract deployment.

Not support.
There is no significant effect of
mining on contract deployment.

Partially support.
Transaction has an immediate
negative effect on mining.
However, it does not have a longterm effect on mining.
Support.

Partially support.
Transaction has both immediate
and long-term negative effects on
mining.

Partially support.
Transaction has a long-term
negative effect on mining.
However, there is no immediate
effect.
Support.

Partially support.
The immediate effect is negative.
However, there is no significant
long-term effect.

Partially support.
The immediate effect is negative.
However, there is no significant
long-term effect.

Support.

Partially support.
Both immediate and long-term
effects are negative.

Between-Subsystem Effect at the Application Layer
H4a. The contract subsystem
exhibits an immediate positive
effect on the exchange subsystem
but no significant long-term
effect.

Not support.
There is no significant effect of
contract deployment on
transaction.

Support.
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Not support.
There is no significant effect of
contract deployment on
transaction.

H4b. The exchange subsystem
exhibits a long-term positive
effect on the contract subsystem
but no significant immediate
effect.
H5a. The protocol subsystem
exhibits a long-term positive
effect on the contract subsystem
but no significant immediate
effect.
H5b. The contract subsystem
exhibits a long-term positive
effect on the protocol subsystem
but no significant immediate
effect.
H6a. The protocol subsystem
exhibits a long-term positive
effect on the exchange subsystem
but no significant immediate
effect.
H6b. The exchange subsystem
exhibits a long-term positive
effect on the protocol subsystem
but no significant immediate
effect.

Not support.
There is no significant effect of
transaction on contract
deployment.

Support.

Partially support.
The long-term effects are
dynamic.

Between-Subsystem Effects Across Layers
Support.

Partially support.
Contract deployment has a longterm positive effect on protocol
development. However, no
significant effect is found from
mining to protocol development.
Support.

Partially support.
The long-term effect of contract
deployment on protocol
development is dynamic. No
significant effect is found from
mining to protocol development.
Support.

Not support.
Transaction shows immediate and
long-term positive effects on
protocol development. However,
no significant effect is found from
mining to protocol development.

Not support.
Transaction shows immediate and
long-term positive effects on
protocol development. However,
no significant effect is found from
mining to protocol development.
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Not support.
There is no significant effect of
contract deployment on
transaction.

Partially support.
Protocol development has a longterm positive effect on contract
deployment. However, it has no
significant effect on mining.
Partially support.
Contract deployment has a longterm positive effect on protocol
development. However, no
significant effect is found from
mining to protocol development.
Not support.
There is no significant effect of
protocol development on
transaction or mining.
Not support.
There is no significant effect
between transaction (or mining)
and protocol development.

Within-subsystem effects. Regarding the dynamic direct network effects between
mining and contract deployment within the contract subsystem. The IRF graphs in Figure 2
indicate that contract deployment has long-term negative effects on mining (in week 7 and 15),
and the effect of mining on contract deployment is non-significant after addressing the issues of
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Hypotheses 1a and 1b are not supported. The dynamic
direct network effects between mining and transaction within the exchange subsystem are shown
in Table 4 and supplemented by IRF graphs in Figure 2. The Granger causality test results
indicate a significant causal relationship between mining and transaction. The results of the IRF
analysis corroborate the results of the Granger causality test. Specifically, the IRF results show
that transaction has an immediate and significant negative network effect on mining but no
significant long-term effect. It means that more transaction leads to an immediate decrease in
mining in the subsequent period. However, there is no significant long-term effect. This provides
partial support for Hypothesis 2a. I also find positive network effects of mining on transaction in
weeks 1 and 7, meaning that an increase in mining in the current period promotes transaction
immediately (after 1 week following the growth shock to mining) and in the long term (after 7
weeks following the growth shock to mining), supporting Hypothesis 2b. In terms of the dynamic
direct interactions within the protocol subsystem, the results in Table 4 and Figure 2 show a
significant immediate and negative effect. It indicates that an increase in protocol development in
the current period decreases protocol development in the next period. No long-term effect is
found. As such, Hypothesis 3 is partially supported.
Between-subsystem effects. After correcting for serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity, I do not find significant relationships between the contract subsystem and the
exchange subsystem. Therefore, Hypothesis 4a and 4b are not supported. Regarding the dynamic

relationships between the contract subsystem and the protocol subsystem, the IRF results in
Figure 2 indicate that protocol development has significant network effects on contract
deployment and mining. Specifically, protocol development shows significant positive network
effects on contract deployment in the long term (at week 6, 17, 18, and 19). The results also
show that protocol development has a positive network effect on mining at week 2, meaning that
a growth of protocol development leads to an increase of mining after two weeks. In sum, the
results provide support for my expectations as stated in Hypothesis 5a. I found that an increase in
contract deployment triggers a significant decrease of protocol development at week 3, while
leading to a significant increase of protocol development at week 4. However, there is no
evidence of significant network effect of mining on protocol development. This partially supports
my Hypothesis 5b. The dynamic interrelationships between the exchange subsystem and protocol
subsystem are shown in Figure 2. The results show that protocol development has a positive
network effect on transaction after two weeks of the growth shock to protocol development. I
also find a significant positive effect of protocol development on mining after two weeks.
Therefore, Hypothesis 6a is supported. As I find significant and positive network effects from
transaction to protocol development both immediately and in the long term, but no significant
effect of mining on protocol development. Therefore, Hypothesis 6b is not supported.
Robustness Checks
I conduct two additional analyses to verify the robustness of my results. The results of
robustness checks are summarized in Table 6. First, I use the number of new smart contracts that
are successfully deployed on Ethereum in each week as an alternative measure to characterize
contract deployment. The reasons for using the incremental increase of smart contracts are
twofold: (1) it is possible that a new smart contract attracts a large amount of use at the early
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stage after its deployment but quickly becomes less attractive. If so, I may not see significant
network effects from contract deployment to transaction. (2) Although an increase in
transactions does not lead to a growth in the total number of contracts at the application layer, it
may attract new smart contracts instead. The test results and IRF graphs are shown in Appendix
B. The results are mostly consistent with the main analysis results. However, I find that contract
deployment has an immediate positive effect on transaction (in week 1), which supports my
Hypothesis 4a. In return, transaction exhibits long-term dynamic effects on contract deployment
(in weeks 10 and 17), which partially supports Hypothesis 4b. These results provide additional
insights for understanding the relationship between contract subsystem and exchange subsystem:
newly deployed smart contracts rather than the total available smart contracts are the ones that
drive transactions on the blockchain platform.
Second, I use an alternative measure to characterize protocol development. I collect the
number of code changes in each development commit and aggregate it to the week level. The
number of code changes reflects the difficulty of the code commit that a developer makes to the
blockchain protocol. It is possible that increased mining activities trigger greater efforts in
revising the blockchain protocol but show no significant effects on the number of commits. The
test results and IRF graphs are shown in Appendix C. After re-estimating the VARX model, the
results remain qualitatively consistent. One exception is that I do not find significant effects from
protocol development on mining or transaction. This indicates that the workload of protocol
developers is not the main reason for the growth of transactions or mining activities. This also
implies that users and miners may not be aware of or do not care much about how much the
protocol has been changed compared to whether developers do their job.
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DISCUSSION
In this study, I sought to advance understanding of dynamic network effects in a highly
decentralized platform-enabled ecosystem. The public blockchain ecosystem is representative of
highly decentralized ecosystems. I identified key participants in a public blockchain ecosystem
and the layers and subsystems of which it is composed. Applying the theoretical lens of value cocreation, I hypothesized the mutual functioning of the underlying subsystems across layers. The
main results from my longitudinal empirical study revealed several findings at the level of
subsystems and their constituent activities.
Overall, the results showed unbalanced and asymmetric network effects in the public
blockchain ecosystem. I made three observations. (1) Interactions between activities within or
cross subsystems are not always mutual. For example, the network effects between mining and
transaction are positive and mutual, while the network effects between mining and protocol
development are unidirectional (only protocol development → mining is significant). (2) The
network effects are asymmetric. According to the IRF results in Figure 2, some network effects
are short lived (e.g., transaction → mining), while some exhibit long-term effects (e.g., protocol
development → contract deployment). (3) Network effects can be negative. While the two-sided
network effects on digital platforms are mostly found to be positive, I find that network effects in
a blockchain ecosystem can be negative. For example, transaction has an immediate negative
network effect on mining.
Another set of findings is subsystem specific. For the contract subsystem, I find that
accumulated smart contracts closely interact with protocol development, while only the
incremental smart contracts drive and are influenced by transaction. Such findings are
reasonable as protocol developers need to maintain the protocol to meet the needs of all smart
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contracts, including the newly deployed and the ones that have been implemented for a long
time. As contract creators implement smart contracts on the blockchain, they are more sensitive
to the changes in the blockchain protocol. Users, however, are more likely attracted by smart
contracts that are recently implemented. I also find that the shared resource and knowledge
within the protocol subsystem are not adequate to motivate protocol developers to continuously
develop the blockchain protocol (as shown in the immediate negative network effect). The longterm positive network effect from contract subsystem and exchange subsystem to protocol
subsystem indicates that the blockchain usage in terms of smart contracts and transactions are the
major motivations that drive protocol development. In addition, I find that network effects within
a subsystem can show up immediately, while the network effects between subsystems across
layers usually take time to manifest. Evidence includes the immediate network effects within the
exchange subsystem and protocol subsystem and the long-term network effects between contract
subsystem and protocol subsystem.
At the activity level, the findings provide unique insight into the dynamic interactions
among activities within and between subsystems across layers. First, the results indicate that
protocol development plays the most critical role in the overall blockchain ecosystem.
Specifically, protocol development has positive cross-layer network effects on mining and
contract deployment. Second, although smart contract is a salient feature that Ethereum include
on its blockchain and the means by which it differentiates itself from Bitcoin, a large number of
available smart contracts do not demonstrate a meaningful influence on growing the usage of the
Ethereum blockchain (as shown in non-significant network effects between contract subsystem
and exchange subsystem when using accumulated smart contracts as the measurement for
contract deployment). Instead, users show more interest in newly implemented smart contracts.
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The results indicate that many smart contracts may become idle quickly after their debut, which
may generate a considerable waste of resources devoted to maintaining an extensive network.
Theoretical Implications
This research has several theoretical implications. First, this research contributes to
literature on platform-enabled ecosystems with a specific focus on decentralized ecosystems
which are underexplored by prior literature (Chen et al. 2021). I identify the distinctiveness of
decentralized ecosystems and stress the importance of understanding how network effects are
generated in such ecosystems. A paradox for digital innovation ecosystems is: “the more
effectively digital technologies enable the division of labor, the more actors join the ecosystem
with their skills and creativity, yet the more difficult it is for the actors to integrate their efforts,
and the more likely the ecosystem fails” (Wang 2021, p. 398). Such paradox becomes more
salient in a highly decentralized ecosystem like a public blockchain ecosystem. As there is no
central authority to orchestrate activities in the ecosystem, the interaction among participants and
the network effects generated can be more dynamic. Autonomous participants need to
collectively figure out how to create value in a manner that satisfies each party’s needs while
adding value to the overall ecosystem as well. From a value co-creation perspective, I explore
what specific value is created (or co-created) and how they underlie these dynamic network
effects.
Network effects in decentralized ecosystems are more complex and dynamic compared to
network effects in centralized ecosystems. As there is no central authority that has ultimate
control of the overall ecosystem, participants’ shared governance power makes network effects
in decentralized ecosystems more dynamic. Evidence can be seen from the negative-positivenegative network effects from one side to the other. The reason could be that the decentralized
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governance is more sensitive to the participation of other parties. People who share governance
power may observe and learn from other parties and use it as guidance for their subsequent
decision-making. In this study, in order to better understand the dynamics of interactions among
multi-side participants, I introduce the layer-subsystem structure, which leads to my second
theorical contribution.
Second, my study augments understanding of complex platform-enabled ecosystems by
decomposing it into layers with different functionalities and self-contained but interrelated
subsystems. This research is the first to conceptually and empirically decompose a platformenabled ecosystem into component parts following recent conceptual work by Wang (2021).
Wang (2021) points out that extant ecosystem studies examined the parts while overlooking the
ecosystem as a whole. Such a focus on parts missed value that is created between subsystems.
Additionally, there is a lack of direct examination of the integration of efforts in ecosystems in
prior literature (Wang 2021). I introduce layer-subsystem as a structure to theorize the dynamics
of how such ecosystems function. Although some digital platform literature discussed a layered
structure or modular structure of a digital platform (e.g., Tiwana et al. 2010), such research
focuses primarily on the technological functions of the platform rather than on the interactions
among participants. My layer-subsystem structure suggests that a participant may exist in more
than one subsystem, which is critical for understanding the nature of participant interactions.
This layer-subsystem structure also provides insight into how value co-creation activities
generate network effects. In general, network effects tend to be more direct within subsystem and
more indirect between subsystems within a layer or across layers.
Third, the insights from my study also contribute to the blockchain literature by
developing a theoretical understanding of blockchain from a managerial perspective. Past studies
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on blockchain concentrate on understanding blockchain from a technical standpoint (Beck et al.
2018). My study focuses on understanding how value is exchanged and whether incentives are
aligned and complement interactions among different participants in a layer-subsystem structure.
Such a managerial perspective provides guidance for blockchain ecosystem design and
governance. For one, the governance of blockchain ecosystems can be understood from the
layer-subsystem perspective: there can be a specific type of participant in charge of orchestrating
other activities at each layer. The governance practice conducted by participants at different
layers may also interact to promote a healthy development of the ecosystem.
Practical Implications
My study also has notable practical contributions. First, my results show that current
incentive mechanisms may not be effective to ensure a healthy functioning Ethereum ecosystem.
Specifically, I find that mining does not increase in response to growing transaction and contract
deployment. A plausible reason may relate to the mechanism of mining difficulty adjustment. As
the rules for validating and broadcasting blocks and resolving conflicts are defined in the
blockchain protocol (Syed et al. 2019), I suggest protocol developers improve the incentive
mechanism to make sure that mining activity increases in line with the increasing demand from
users and contract creators so that they benefit from the blockchain technology-in-use.
Second, an incentive mechanism in the protocol subsystem is needed to encourage a
diversity of developers to engage in protocol development activities. The negative network
effects within the protocol subsystem indicate that shared resources and knowledge are not
adequate to motivate protocol developers to continuously develop the blockchain protocol. Most
development activities for a public blockchain ecosystem happen in an open-source development
community where developers’ commitments are usually described as voluntary (Andersen and
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Bogusz 2017). How to integrate developers’ efforts to continuously develop and improve the
blockchain protocol is a critical question to solve, especially for public blockchain ecosystems
that do not have a sponsoring firm behind the protocol development community.
Third, I suggest that both protocol developers and contract creators discover and broaden
the application scenarios of smart contracts. The results show that increasing the number of
available smart contracts does not lead to a growth in transactions. One reason could be the
application potential of smart contracts has not been fully realized given the nascent
development and application of blockchain technology in business and society. A direction for
the development of public blockchain ecosystems is to explore the application areas of smart
contracts to emphasize the important role of contract creators.
Limitation and Future Research
This study has some limitations and creates opportunities for future research. First, this
study focuses on the public blockchain in a specific empirical setting. My decision to focus on a
public blockchain ecosystem was informed by my theoretical interest in platform-enabled
ecosystems without a central authority. Future studies may consider generalizing or expanding
insights by examining other types of blockchain ecosystems, such as private blockchain
ecosystems and consortium blockchain ecosystems. Second, future studies can examine the
impact of different blockchain protocol designs on mining activities in order to develop a better
sense of an appropriate incentive mechanism for miners. Current incentives may be too costprohibitive to motivate miners to engage. They face dual costs of needing to invest in robust
computational infrastructure as well as paying for the energy consumption required by the POW
consensus algorithm. There is currently some emerging discussion around proof of stake as a
more energy conservation-friendly approach that may be less onerous on miners.
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CONCLUSION
My study surfaces the unbalanced and asymmetric features of network effects in the
public blockchain ecosystem. My findings reveal mutual effects across sides within the exchange
subsystem and an immediately negative effect within the protocol subsystem. In addition, I find
that the contract subsystem and protocol subsystem are closely interdependent with each other.
Overall, my study reveals the dynamic and coevolving interactions within and between
subsystems across layers, which helps us understand the functioning of the overall public
blockchain ecosystem.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A
VARX Results

CD!"#
CD!"$
CD!"%
CD!"&
CD!"'
MN!"#
MN!"$
MN("%
MN("&
MN("'
TXN("#
TXN("$
TXN("%
TXN("&
TXN("'
PD("#
PD!"$

CD
0.561*** (0.100)
-0.164 (0.102)
0.215* (0.129)
0.084 (0.076)
-0.030 (0.072)
0.003 (0.068)
-0.001 (0.038)
0.117 (0.080)
-0.006 (0.044)
0.048 (0.062)
-0.006 (0.029)

Dependent Variables
MN
TXN
-0.447** (0.190)
-0.290 (0.211)
0.502** (0.225)
0.552** (0.250)
-0.171 (0.220)
-0.155 (0.245)
0.181 (0.221)
0.057 (0.245)
0.110 (0.193)
0.150 (0.215)
0.124 (0.117)
0.847*** (0.130)
0.158 (0.136)
0.766*** (0.151)
0.012 (0.138)
0.530*** (0.154)
0.105 (0.141)
0.498*** (0.156)
-0.049 (0.130)
0.298** (0.145)
-0.249** (0.098)
-1.062*** (0.109)

PD
-1.624 (1.685)
1.626 (2.000)
-5.348*** (1.957)
5.295*** (1.961)
-0.178 (1.715)
-0.064 (1.041)
-1.518 (1.207)
-2.093* (1.228)
0.916 (1.250)
-0.150 (1.157)
1.549* (0.874)

-0.035 (0.046)
-0.033 (0.049)

-0.252** (0.124)
0.081 (0.128)

-0.926*** (0.138)
-0.636*** (0.143)

0.488 (1.106)
0.400 (1.140)

-0.009 (0.035)
0.007 (0.022)
0.006 (0.004)
0.003 (0.007)
-0.004 (0.007)
-0.012* (0.007)
-0.007* (0.004)

-0.016 (0.121)
0.097 (0.100)
0.002 (0.010)
0.024** (0.012)
0.016 (0.013)
0.001 (0.012)
-0.016 (0.010)

-0.497*** (0.135)
-0.213* (0.111)
-0.002 (0.011)
-0.024* (0.014)
-0.013* (0.015)
-0.001 (0.013)
-0.017 (0.011)

-0.420 (1.079)
0.167 (0.885)
-0.652*** (0.086)
-0.460*** (0.108)
-0.395*** (0.116)
-0.203* (0.108)
-0.183** (0.090)

PD!"%
PD!"&
PD!"'
Control
Y
Y
Y
Y
Variables
R square 0.498
0.273
0.456
0.506
Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol
Development, respectively. Control variables include Ether Price, Mining Difficulty, Version Release,
and Hard Fork. N = 199. Variables are logged. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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APPENDIX B
Robustness Check: Using New contracts as Contract Deployment
TABLE B1
Granger Causality Test (New Contracts as CD)
Dependent Variables
MN
TXN
PD
CD
–
4.415
10.570*
5.069
1.642
–
62.439***
5.168
MN
4.968
15.585***
–
3.879
TXN
PD
14.211**
9.349*
8.816
17.366
Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol
Development, respectively. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
CD

TABLE B2
Tests for Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity (New Contracts as CD)
Dependent Variable
Breusch-Godfrey Test
Transaction
3.202 (0.669)
Contract Deployment
3.626 (0.605)
Mining
4.458 (0.486)
Protocol Development
13.117 (0.022)
)
Notes: The results show ( values with p-values in parentheses.

Breusch-Pagan Test
3.200 (0.074)
11.480 (0.001)
3.610 (0.058)
1.380 (0.241)
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FIGURE B (Continued)
Impulse Response Functions (New Contracts as CD)
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APPENDIX C
Robustness Check: Using Code Changes as Protocol Development
TABLE C1
Granger Causality Test (Code Changes as PD)
Dependent Variables
MN
TXN
PD
CD
–
5.350
4.690
9.946*
8.193
–
54.727***
4.428
MN
0.886
11.280**
–
4.631
TXN
PD
7.303
2.665
2.145
17.061
Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol
Development, respectively. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
CD

TABLE C2
Tests for Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity (Code Changes as PD)
Dependent Variable
Breusch-Godfrey Test
Transaction
2.836 (0.725)
Contract Deployment
3.691 (0.595)
Mining
2.889 (0.717)
Protocol Development
0.050 (0.830)
Notes: The results show !! values with p-values in parentheses.

Breusch-Pagan Test
3.190 (0.074)
4.660 (0.031)
19.160 (0.000)
9.570 (0.088)
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FIGURE C (Continued)
Impulse Response Functions (Code Changes as PD)
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CHAPTER 3. DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE IN A PUBLIC BLOCKCHAIN
ECOSYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
Digital platform-enabled ecosystems play a dominant role in today’s economy, and a
suitable governance approach is key to orchestrating a successful platform-enabled ecosystem
for all stakeholders (Schreieck et al. 2016). In a broad sense, governance of platform-enabled
ecosystems can be defined as the structures that determine “how rigidly authority is exerted and
who has authority to make decisions and craft rules for orchestrating key activities” (Maruping
and Yang 2020, p. 1). Governance mechanisms are viewed as a means for orchestrators to solve
challenges and exert influence over participants in the ecosystem (Schmeiss et al. 2019; Song et
al. 2018; Tiwana et al. 2010). Although governance is a multifaceted concept with aspects such
as decision rights, accountability, and incentives, the central element of governance is decisionmaking authority (Brown and Grant 2005; Chen et al. 2021; Tiwana 2009). Depending on
whether decision-making authority is in the hands of a central party or distributed to participants,
governance is characterized as centralized or decentralized (Brown and Grant 2005; Huber et al.
2017; Tiwana et al. 2010).
An ecosystem with centralized forms of governance usually consists of a platform leader
(or owner, sponsor) that designs and governs the technical architecture and different groups of
actors (such as complementors and users) that interact on the platform (Schmeiss et al. 2019).
The primary purpose of governing typical digital platform-enabled ecosystems is for the platform
owner to lead stakeholders to create value (Kyprianou 2018; Rietveld et al. 2019). For example,
a platform sponsor can selectively promote individual complements to manage the value of the
overall ecosystem (Rietveld et al. 2019). Despite the merits of centralized governance such as
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exclusive governance control for platform owners to shape innovation processes and outcomes,
there are also issues inherent to centralized governance, such as a lack of transparency,
corruption, coercion, censorship, and excessive market power (Atzori 2015; Chen et al. 2021)
In recent years, decentralized governance has been increasingly embraced to deal with
centralized governance’s issues (Atzori 2015; Pereira et al. 2019). An example is open-source
software development platforms where multiple decentralized governance mechanisms are
designed and enacted, such as self-assignment mechanism, monitoring and sanction mechanism,
and reputation mechanism (Di Tullio and Staples 2013). The emergence of blockchain
technology has promoted the emergence of a growing number of decentralized digital platformenabled ecosystems that are governed by community efforts (Chen et al. 2021; Hsieh et al.
2018). Among all types of blockchain, public blockchain (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum) opens all
transaction records to the public and allows everyone to participate in the process of block
validation without restrictions. These ecosystems do not have a platform owner as the trusted
third party who orchestrates the overall ecosystem, and the value creation in these ecosystems
depends on the incentive alignment of multiple types of actors on different sides of interactions
and their spontaneous participation.
The extant literature has tended to place a greater emphasis on centralized governance.
Further, the platform literature on governance has tended to focus on centralized governance and
has done so primarily in the context of the platform itself rather than the platform ecosystem.
Less attention has been paid to platform-enabled ecosystems with highly decentralized
governance. There are two plausible reasons for the lack of studies on this subject: First, an
ecosystem involves multiple sides of actors on various platforms, making it much more complex
than a study on two-sided digital platforms. Second, it is practically difficult for an ecosystem to
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achieve decentralized governance, since centralized governance allows platform owners to
manage value co-creation and value capture processes within the ecosystem and acquire the most
profit from the innovation process (Pereira et al. 2019; Rietveld et al. 2019).
Based on these observations and distinctive attributes of public blockchain ecosystems, I
argue that there are limits to the lessons that can be drawn from the cumulative literature on
governance of digital platform ecosystems. For one, as ecosystem participants may hold vastly
diverse perspectives and interests, they may find it difficult to achieve consensus on a specific
blockchain ecosystem governance mechanism (Chen et al. 2021). It is possible that a governance
mechanism that is locally optimal may be globally suboptimal or even destructive. As such,
decision makers need to observe and learn from other ecosystem participants’ behaviors to guide
their subsequent governance practices. This makes decentralized governance mechanisms more
dynamic compared to centralized governance mechanisms.
I argue that the governance mechanisms of a blockchain ecosystem are critical for its
sustainability as they enable stakeholders to discuss and make decisions on how the blockchain
should evolve (van Pelt et al. 2021). Prior studies have conceptually discussed decentralized
governance enabled by blockchain technologies (e.g., Atzori 2015; Beck et al. 2018; Glaser
2017; Pereira et al. 2019; van Pelt et al. 2021). Example topics include conceptualization of
decentralized governance and its dimensions (e.g., Beck et al. 2018; van Pelt et al. 2021),
fundamental principles and assumptions of blockchain-based governance (e.g., Atzori 2015), and
a comparison of centralized governance and decentralized governance (e.g., Pereira et al. 2019).
Little is known about what and how key decisions are made and enforced in blockchain
ecosystems and more importantly, how they dynamically affect economic activities (Beck et al.
2018; Hsieh et al. 2018; van Pelt et al. 2021; Ziolkowski et al. 2020). Participants may find it
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difficult to understand the mechanisms of blockchain ecosystem governance. Some are not even
aware that they are stakeholders themselves in the decisions made during blockchain governance
(van Pelt et al. 2021). If participants do not know that they have a stake in decision making, they
may not feel responsible for contributing to the blockchain ecosystem’s development.
The objectives of this research are two-fold: (1) to identify the decentralized governance
mechanisms and determine who has the governance power in terms of decision-making rights in
platform-enabled ecosystems that are fundamentally decentralized in their composition, and (2)
to understand the impacts of these decentralized governance mechanisms on ecosystem
functioning. I conceptualize decision control and decision management mechanisms building on
Fama and Jensen’s (1983) framework of decision processes in organizations, and contextualize
these mechanisms to the layered structure of the blockchain ecosystem. Then, I examine the
dynamic influences of specific governance mechanisms on participants’ activities within and
across different layers and the interactions between different governance mechanisms.
I conduct a time-series analysis using weekly time-series data collected from Ethereum
and its protocol repository on GitHub between January 2016 and October 2019. I utilize vector
autoregression (VAR) to examine the hypotheses. My findings reveal dynamic effects of
decision mechanisms on other economic activities at the application layer and at the architecture
layer, respectively. The results also show the significant effect of the decision control mechanism
on the decision management mechanism across layers.
This research presents three key contributions to the ecosystem governance and
blockchain literatures. First, by decomposing the ecosystem into interrelated layers, my study
sheds light on understanding decentralized ecosystem governance. Second, my study extends
Fama and Jensen’s (1983) two types of decision activities from a centralized organization
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context to the decentralized ecosystem context, providing a unique angle for understanding
highly decentralized governance. Third, my study adds new insight to the blockchain literature
by empirically examining the dynamic influences of decentralized governance mechanisms while
the existing research mainly focuses on blockchain-enabled governance from a theoretical
perspective (Constantinides et al. 2018; Risius and Spohrer 2017). These findings also generate
important practical implications as to how the governance of public blockchain ecosystems can
be improved.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Layered Structure of a Public Blockchain Ecosystem
A public blockchain ecosystem usually consists of four types of participants: users,
contract creators, miners, and protocol developers. Users engage in transaction activities or
invoke smart contracts. I refer to these as transaction activities. A smart contract is a piece of
self-executing code that defines the rules and penalties around an agreement and automatically
executes and enforces the obligation (Janssen et al. 2020). Contract creators deploy new smart
contracts on the blockchain platform, referred to as contract deployment activities. Miners verify
the validity of transactions and smart contracts to ensure the consistency of the records by
solving a cryptographic puzzle. Such activities are referred to as mining activities (Arnosti and
Weinberg 2019). Protocol developers develop and improve the underlying blockchain protocol to
support on-platform activities. I call these protocol development activities. A blockchain protocol
defines the main rules that govern the platform’s functioning and the data infrastructure (Buterin
2014). Table 1 summarizes different types of participants and the economic activities in which
they engage.
TABLE 1
Participants and Activities in A Public Blockchain Ecosystem
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Participant

Description

Economic Activity

Miners

Participants who verify blocks of
transactions and contracts and keep
complete records of the transaction
history.
Participants who create smart contracts
and deploy the smart contracts on a
blockchain.

Application Layer

Contract creators

Participants who transfer money (in
cryptocurrencies) or invoke smart
contracts.

Users

Mining: a validation process to
ensure a block of transactions is
valid before adding it to the
blockchain.
Smart contract deployment: a
transaction that is sent from the
contract creator with the purpose of
deploying a new contract on the
blockchain.
Transaction: a signed data package
that stores money or a message sent
from one account to another. A
transaction can be made from a user
to another user, or from a user to a
smart contract.

Architecture Layer
Protocol
developers

Participants who create and improve
the underlying blockchain protocol.

Protocol development: code
contributions from developers to
develop and improve the blockchain
protocol.

A layered structure is commonly seen in digital technology architecture, which enables
separation between device and service and the separation between network and content
(Adomavicius et al. 2008). A digital platform-enabled ecosystem can also be viewed as a multilayer entity. The application layer is where business logic is developed and complementors
provide services, and the infrastructure layer is where platform owners manage users and
maintain the database (Glaser 2017). Yoo et al. (2010) proposed a layered modular architecture
in which the layered architecture of digital technology enhances product functionality with
software-based capabilities. In digital innovation ecosystems, the multiple layers of
complementary products increase task interdependencies, making the ecosystem more complex
and challenging to manage (Kapoor and Agarwal 2017; Wang 2021).
Based on prior literature on the layered structure of digital platform-enabled ecosystems
and blockchain technology characteristics, I conceptually divide the blockchain ecosystem into
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application layer and architecture layer (Andersen and Bogusz 2017; Glaser 2017). The
application layer of a blockchain ecosystem deals with application functionalities that directly
serve participants as they exchange digital assets, implement smart contracts, and verify
transactions on the blockchain platform (Glaser 2017). The architecture layer of a blockchain
ecosystem includes activities that contribute to designing, developing, and implementing the
underlying architecture of blockchain technologies, which is at the heart of value creation for
participants on the application layer (Andersen and Bogusz 2017; Pereira et al. 2019; Stabell and
Fjeldstad 1998).
Governance
Corporate governance is one of the dominant research areas in the finance and
management literature. In the corporate context, governance mainly deals with the agency
problem–the separation of management and finance (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Williamson
1988). Corporate governance is understood as “structures and procedures that aim to ensure that
(1) authority responsibility and control flows ‘downwards’ from the investors through a board of
directors to management and finally, to the employees; and (2) accountability flows ‘upwards’”
(Fenwick et al. 2019, pp. 178-179). The fundamental question of corporate governance is how to
assure investors that they get a return on their financial investment (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
With the wide adoption of information technology (IT), IT governance has received a
significant increase in attention from business management. IT governance is defined as “the
framework for decision rights and accountability to encourage desirable behavior in the use of
IT” (Weill 2004, p. 3). A substantial number of studies have discussed and theorized the virtues
of prudent, practical, and well-aligned IT governance (Brown and Grant 2005; Tiwana 2009).
Brown and Grant (2005) conducted a comprehensive review of IT governance literature and
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grouped them into two research streams: the research on IT governance forms regarding IT
decision-making locus and structures and the research on IT governance contingency analysis for
uniform and non-uniform governance frameworks.
The emergence of digital platforms opens a research branch of IT governance. Compared
to corporate IT governance, digital platform governance is more open and community-driven as
the platform leverages networked technologies to promote economic exchange, transfer
information, and encourage collaboration among multiple stakeholders (Fenwick et al. 2019).
Here, digital platform governance is defined as the partitioning of decision-making authority
between platform owners and complementors (i.e., decision right), control mechanisms (i.e.,
control), and pie-sharing structures (i.e., pricing) (Tiwana et al. 2013). More topics in this area
focus on the structuring of decision-making authority and control rights to ensure effective value
creation and fair value distribution (Chen et al. 2021).
The context of exerting governance becomes more complex when there is more than one
digital platform functioning altogether as an ecosystem. In a digital platform-enabled ecosystem,
the alignment of multi-side participants’ incentives becomes particularly important as it helps
understand the relationship among participants and guides the design for appropriate governance
mechanisms (Alves et al. 2017). Beck et al. (2018) describe ecosystem governance as the
mechanism that determines who makes each type of decision (decision right), incentives for
participants to engage in value creation in the ecosystem (incentive structure), and types of
formal and informal control mechanisms used to ensure the alignment of participants’ incentives
(control mechanism). The existing governance literature has been centered on the ecosystems of
two-sided digital platforms (e.g., Rietveld et al. 2020; Wareham et al. 2014). A salient feature of
such ecosystems is the centralized decision-making authority of platform owners. As such, many
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studies focus on governance from the platform owners’ perspective (Schreieck et al. 2016). In a
high centralized governance ecosystem, platform owners enjoy exclusive governance control,
which allows them to apply appropriate governance mechanisms to motivate third-party
complementors (Rietveld et al. 2020), orchestrate the innovation process (Boudreau 2010;
Wareham et al. 2014), regulate access and interactions among users and complementors, and
enhance network effects and attract users (Pereira et al. 2019). However, platform owners with
centralized decision-making authority may put the digital platform at risk in pursuing activities
that benefit themselves at the expense of other stakeholders (Chen et al. 2021). For example, the
platform owner can control downstream innovation by complementors, increasing profits
through an optimal choice of platform openness but harming the interests of the complementors
(Parker and Alstyne 2008).
Some studies have explored digital platform-enabled ecosystems where the platform
owners distribute a degree of decision-making authority to participants. However, these studies
still pay specific attention to platforms owned or sponsored by a third party. For example, Huber
et al. (2017) identify two governance routes and develop a process theory to explain how
different routes successfully navigate the governance tension between co-created value and
governance costs. In this process, platform owners assign partnership managers to enact
ecosystem-wide rules and values. Tiwana et al. (2010) discuss decision rights partitioning
between the platform owner and module developers and explore its impact on the evolution of
the overall ecosystem. Nevertheless, the governance of ecosystems with highly decentralized
decision-making authority remains understudied. There is no platform owner in such an extreme
form of governance, and platform participants collectively enjoy full governance control (Chen
et al. 2021). Notably, an absence of the platform owner does not mean the absence of

77

governance. Instead, highly decentralized governance emphasizes maximizing the overall
welfare of all participants rather than the residual profits of the platform owner (Chen et al.
2021). It also allows platform participants to engage in decision-making and represent their
perspectives and leverage their local information to improve the informational efficiency of
platform governance processes (Chen et al. 2021).
I believe that a focus on governance in decentralized platform-enabled ecosystems is
theoretically essential. A digital platform-enabled ecosystem is a loosely coupled set of
autonomous participants who interact without hierarchical fiat. The more participants join the
ecosystem with their skills and creativity, the more difficult it is for participants to integrate their
efforts to sustain the ecosystem (Wang 2021). Such complexity of ecosystems requires that
governance be more decentralized to support participants’ interdependencies. The basic idea
behind adopting decentralized governance is to provide a fault-tolerant distributed computing
environment where the authority is distributed, ensuring trust, transparency, and data integrity
(Syed et al. 2019). For ecosystem participants, the complexity, interdependencies, and
uncertainties require them to collect relevant information to inform decision-making (Wang
2021). As there is no central authority to orchestrate the overall ecosystem, participants’
decision-making process can be more sensitive to others’ actions, making decentralized
governance a dynamic and mutually reinforcing mechanism.
Decentralized Governance in the Public Blockchain Ecosystem
Blockchain technology creates an “architecture of trust” in which multi-side participants
do not need to know or trust each other to interact safely under predetermined conditions defined
by the blockchain protocol and smart contracts (Schmeiss et al. 2019). All interactions are
transparently executed on a blockchain platform and stored in a distributed ledger that follows
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the rules defined by the blockchain protocol (Schmeiss et al. 2019). As I stated, in a centralized
digital platform-enabled ecosystem, the platform owner proposes and nurtures the value creation
mechanism and thus has the ultimate decision-making authority. In a public blockchain
ecosystem, participants collectively define the value proposition of the ecosystem and enjoy
complete governance control—referred to as highly decentralized governance (Chen et al. 2021).
For example, in Ethereum, the blockchain network is neither owned nor controlled by any single
entity (Atzori 2015). Developers who are active in code contribution gain decision-making
power.
Nevertheless, not all participants have decision-making power. I argue that the
decentralization of such decision-making power is reflected in two ways. In the subsections that
follow, I discuss the decision process framework proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983) and
extended by Tiwana (2009). Combining the framework with the layered structure of the
blockchain ecosystem, I identify three decentralized decision-making mechanisms exerted in a
public blockchain ecosystem (Table 2 compares decision activities in different research
contexts).
Two Classes of Decision Activities. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that allocating
“ownership” and “control” to different agents is vital in explaining the survival of organizations,
meaning that important decision makers do not hold a substantial share of the wealth effects of
their decisions. Fama and Jensen (1983) identify four steps of activities in a decision process:
ratification–choice and approval of the initiatives to be implemented, monitoring–specification
and implementation of performance measurement criteria, initiation–generation of proposals for
resource utilization of organizational contracts, and implementation–execution of ratified
decisions. As ratification and monitoring of decisions are typically allocated to the same agent in
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the organization, they are combined as decision control. Similarly, the initiation and
implementation of decisions are clustered as decision management (Fama and Jensen 1983). In
entrepreneurial firms that are characterized by separation of decision management and residual
risk bearing, decision management is allocated to internal managers, while decision control is
delegated in a board of external directors (Fama and Jensen 1983). The key benefit of doing so is
to decrease the possibility of collusion between top-level decision management and control
agents.
Building on Fama and Jensen’s (1983) work, Tiwana (2009) conceptualized decision
rights in information systems development projects, where ratification and monitoring involves
“establishing rewards and penalties for project outcomes, and implementing mechanisms to
evaluate the project team’s performance, specifying project milestones and deliverables, and
monitoring project process” (Tiwana 2009, p. 182). Implementation and initiation involves
activities such as “systems design, software architecture design, and the definition of application
features/functionality” (Tiwana 2009, p. 182). Unlike the original definition, which emphasizes
the exclusive allocation of decision management and decision control to different agents, Tiwana
(2009) states that these two decision rights are usually shared to varying degrees by the IT and
client departments in information system development practice.
I argue that the conceptualization of two decision classes fits in the context of
decentralized platform-enabled ecosystems. First, the ecosystem’s layered structure makes it
convenient to partition decision-making activities into decision control and decision management
and assign them to different groups of participants. Specifically, decision management activities
happen at the architecture layer, where new features of the blockchain protocol are initiated and
implemented. Decision control activities occur at the application layer, where economic
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activities such as transactions and contract deployment are regulated. Second, the
conceptualization of the two decision classes of decisions can streamline my understanding of
decentralized governance. The governance complexity of a multi-side ecosystem is high, and it is
even higher when there is no central authority with ultimate control over the ecosystem (Wang
2021). Clustering decision activities into decision control and decision management provides a
structure to understand the exercise of governance in the context of decentralized ecosystems.
However, as decision rights are decentralized to participants (Pereira et al. 2019; van Pelt et al.
2021), the conceptualization of two decision classes needs to be revisited before translating into
a decentralized ecosystem context.
As this research focuses on the mechanisms that participants utilize to govern the
decentralized ecosystem, I conceptualize governance mechanisms in a public blockchain
ecosystem as comprising two classes: the decision control mechanism at the application layer
and the decision management mechanism at the architecture layer (Andersen and Bogusz 2017;
van Pelt et al. 2021). In the following two subsections, I provide an in-depth discussion on the
two decision classes in the public blockchain ecosystem and their most used mechanisms.
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Class of Decision
Activities
Decision Control

Decision
Management

Relevant Literature

TABLE 2
Classes of Decision Activities in Different Research Contexts
Research Context
Entrepreneurial firms
System development project
Blockchain ecosystem
Ratification: choose decision
Ratification: specify project
Ratification: vote for core
initiatives to be implemented
milestones and deliverables
developers’ decisions, and indicate
interest in continuous participation
Monitoring: measure the
Monitoring: establish rewards and
performance of decision agents,
penalties for project outcomes,
Monitoring: select and verify
and implement rewards
evaluate the project team’s
pending transaction and contract
performance, and monitor project
deployment requests, and adjust
progress
the block gas limit
Initiation: generate proposals for
Initiation: design systems and
Initiation: generate proposals
resource utilization and structuring software architecture, select a
related to blockchain protocol
of contracts
software platform, and define
development
application functionality
Implementation: execute ratified
Implementation: execute ratified
decisions
Implementation: develop
changes to the blockchain
methodology and programming
protocol, and release new versions
language
of client software
Fama and Jensen 1983

Tiwana 2009
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Beck et al. 2018; van Pelt et al.
2021

Decision Control Mechanism at the Application Layer. According to Fama and Jensen
(1983), decision control encompasses ratification and monitoring activities. In the blockchain
ecosystems context, ratification involves voting for the proposal initiated by protocol developers
and indicating interest in continuous participation. In blockchain ecosystems such as the Tezos
ecosystem, participants who hold tokens have the right to vote for motions proposed by protocol
developers. In some blockchain ecosystems, for example, the Ethereum ecosystem, the voting
role is weakened. Another way to show participants’ support for core developers’ decisions is to
indicate continuous participation (Pereira et al. 2019). In blockchain ecosystems, monitoring
includes selecting and verifying pending transactions and contract deployment requests and
adjusting the block gas limit. Unlike monitoring activities conceptualized by prior literature,
there is no specific mechanism for participants to implement criteria of decision makers’
performance in public blockchain ecosystems, which dampens its functionality in terms of
performance evaluation. However, participants can exert their decision control power by
monitoring all the exchange activities at the application layer. At the application layer, miners
are the major decision makers as they play a critical role in examining the validity of transactions
and smart contracts and maintain a digitally shared, distributed ledger recording their history
(Hsieh et al. 2018; Pereira et al. 2019).
Notably, the authority for miners to exercise decision control is distributed across
multiple participants rather than concentrating on a single entity. Distributing decision control
across multiple participants usually incurs coordination costs as miners need to communicate and
agree upon ratification decisions (Schmeiss et al. 2019). Network capacity adjustment is a
commonly used decision control mechanism that adopts a market-based approach to this
coordination. Network capacity is the blockchain’s capability of verifying transactions and smart
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contracts in a given period (van Pelt et al. 2021). It can be captured by the average number of
pending transactions and smart contracts that can be included in one block at a time. As the
verification process usually consumes a large amount of computational power, a critical issue for
miners is allocating their limited resources to gain as many rewards as possible. As suggested by
Hayek (1945), price is an effective communication mechanism at scale. He pointed out that “in a
system where the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many people, prices can act
to coordinate the separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective values help
the individual to coordinate the parts of his plan” (Hayek 1945, p. 526). Through this price
mechanism, “the whole acts as one market, not because any of its members survey the whole
field, but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through
many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all” (Hayek 1945, p. 526). In
the public blockchain ecosystem context, mining rewards are the “prices” to miners. The local
rewards to each miner are connected in a manner determined by the block gas limit, which brings
about the solution (increase or decrease the average block gas limit, i.e., network capacity) which
might have been arrived at by one single mind possessing all the information which is in fact
dispersed among all the miners at the application layer. An increase in the network capacity
enables miners to include more transactions, thus gaining higher rewards. However, it slows
down the block verification process as it requires more computational power to verify
transactions. A decrease in the network capacity can speed up block verification but causes a
drop in rewards for mining a block. Adjusting network capacity may also send out signals to
both transaction senders and smart contract creators regarding the speed and cost of having their
pending requests fulfilled, which can influence their subsequent participation (Beck et al. 2018).
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As such, multiple miners can implicitly coordinate their exercise of decision control by adjusting
network capacity.
Based on the discussion, I conceptually define decision control mechanism as the means
by which miners select and verify transaction and contract deployment requests at the application
layer. In this research, I specifically focus on network capacity adjustment as the decision control
mechanism.
Decision Management Mechanisms at the Architecture Layer. According to Fama and
Jensen (1983), decision management includes initiation and implementation activities. In public
blockchain ecosystems, initiation and implementation involve generating proposals related to
blockchain protocol development, executing ratified changes to the blockchain protocol, and
releasing new versions of client software. Most blockchain platforms rely on open-source
communities for continued protocol development (Chen et al. 2021; Ziolkowski et al. 2020).
Because of the complexity of digital infrastructures at a large scale (such as blockchain),
distributed forms of control are often the only way to organize digital infrastructure (Andersen
and Bogusz 2017). In the public blockchain ecosystem context, decision management rights are
distributed to core developers (van Pelt et al. 2021). Just like the flexibility of being a miner, any
protocol developer can become a core developer, and membership in the core developer team is
not fixed (Hsieh et al. 2018). However, the difference is that the core developer team’s size is
much smaller than the size of the group of miners, meaning that it would be relatively easier for
core developers to reach a consensus upon a decision.
In general, core developers exercise two decision management via two mechanisms: first,
core developers review, accept or decline pull requests and implement the changes in the next
version of the blockchain client software. I refer to these kinds of decisions as client update.
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Updates to the client software are an important way to address governance by improving the
blockchain platform’s design and architecture (Tiwana 2014). Frequent changes to the client
software may generate both benefits and counterproductive effects (Song et al. 2018). On the one
hand, frequent updates suggest that the platform is constantly improved, boosting developers’
confidence (Arora et al. 2006). On the other hand, frequent updates may increase developers’
pressure to adapt to new functionalities (Boudreau 2010) and dealing with uncertainties (Kapoor
and Agarwal 2017) and more technical debt (Ramasubbu and Kemerer 2016). As such, core
developers can exercise decision management by deliberately scheduling client updates.
Second, core developers can initiate a code fork when miners’ interests diverge (Gervais
et al. 2014; Ziolkowski et al. 2020). I refer to the decisions on releasing a new code fork as
network upgrade. Different from client update that incorporates new features into the blockchain
protocol, a code fork enables fundamental changes in the underlying protocol code such that the
new version and the old version of the code are forward incompatible. From this perspective, a
code fork usually represents a radical change in the organizational structure (Andersen and
Bogusz 2017). For example, a code fork may include adjusting the amount of rewards to miners
(Gervais et al. 2014; Ziolkowski et al. 2020). The influence of code forks is also multifaceted.
For one, code forks may change power dynamics and make decision-making controlled by fewer
people (Andersen and Bogusz 2017). However, adapting to the changing environment through
code forks may also attract new users to the community (Andersen and Bogusz 2017). The
community may become more homogeneous due to the departure of participants with dissenting
opinions (Pereira et al. 2019). As such, core developers need to plan code forks as an exercise of
decision management subtly.
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In sum, I conceptually define decision management mechanism as the means by which
core developers generate and execute proposals for improving the blockchain protocol. In this
research, I specifically focus on client update and network upgrade as two decision management
mechanisms. Exercising different decision management mechanisms may signal unobservable
protocol quality and the core developer team’s commitment level, affecting protocol developers’
subsequent contributions.
Connection between Decision Control Mechanism and Decision Management
Mechanism. It is noteworthy that the dual role of miners is a critical characteristic that
distinguishes the governance of public blockchain ecosystems from the governance in
centralized organizations. On the one hand, miners are the decision-makers at the application
layer whose exercise of decision control mechanisms can affect the behaviors of other
participants. On the other hand, miners also follow the predefined rules in the blockchain
protocol, making them users for protocol developers on the architecture. Miners’ dual identities
imply a potential relationship between exercising the decision control mechanism and decision
management mechanisms, which I will discuss in the next section. Figure 1 illustrates the
research model.
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Effects of Decision Control Mechanism at the Application Layer
Network capacity is the primary means by which miners exercise decision control. The
average block gas limit can be used to understand the network capacity of a blockchain. Block
gas limit determines the maximum gas of a block, which indicates the approximate number of
transactions or smart contracts that can be included in a block. Miners’ decision control governs
the activity of users and contract creators. Specifically, enhanced network capacity enables
miners to include more pending transactions and smart contracts in one block, which requires
more computational power to verify and slows down solving the cryptographic puzzle
(Seifelnasr et al. 2020). Users and contract creators need to wait for a longer time to get their
pending exchanges verified. However, fitting more exchanges into one block can decrease the
transaction fee that users and contract creators pay to fulfill their requests promptly. As such,
whether to use the blockchain depends on how users and contract creators evaluate the trade-offs
between waiting time and transaction fees. As contract deployment is a one-time activity for
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contract creators, saving on transaction fees is less likely to affect them much. In contrast, a
longer waiting time may reduce prospective users as it affects the user experience on invoking
their smart contract. Therefore, I expect that an upward adjustment on network capacity will
negatively affect contract deployment in subsequent periods. Compared to contract deployment
activities, transaction activities occur more frequently. As such, users may be more sensitive to
both time and monetary costs spent on transaction verification. An increase in network capacity
leads to an immediate verification delay, while a reduced transaction fee encourages user
participation. In the short term, these two effects may cancel each other out. In the long term, as
miners continuously invest in infrastructure to gain greater mining power, the verification delay
can be improved gradually. A higher network capacity indicates that miners can handle more
verification requests. Users will benefit more from the reduced transaction fee, which boosts
users’ confidence in participating in the ecosystem. In sum, I hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 1a. Network capacity adjustment has a short-term negative effect on
subsequent contract deployment, such that an increase shock to block gas limit will lead
to a decrease in the deployment activities of new smart contracts in the short term.
Hypothesis 1b. Network capacity adjustment has a long-term positive effect on
subsequent transactions, such that an increase shock to block gas limit will lead to an
increase in transaction activities in the long term.
Users’ and contract creators’ participation shapes how miners exercise decision control as
reflected in adjusting network capacity. As stated, without a central authority, decision-makers in
a highly decentralized ecosystem frequently observe and learn from other participants’ behaviors
to guide their subsequent governance activities. I expect feedback effects from activities to
governance mechanisms. When transactions and contract deployment activities increase at the
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application layer, miners have more pending requests to select. However, miners are restricted by
the network capacity. They cannot verify as many exchanges as they want. In order to gain
higher rewards, miners are more likely to lift the network capacity. On the contrary, when the
number of transactions and new smart contracts decreases, miners will perceive it as a signal that
their strategy of increasing network capacity does not work well. They may consider decreasing
the network capacity to speed up the verification process to attract more transactions and contract
deployment activities. In sum, I hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 2a. Contract deployment has a short-term positive effect on subsequent
network capacity adjustment, such that an increase shock to deployment activities will
lead to an increase in block gas limit in the short term.
Hypothesis 2b. Transaction has a short-term positive effect on subsequent network
capacity adjustment, such that an increase shock to transaction activities will lead to an
increase in block gas limit in the short term.
Effects of Decision Management Mechanisms at the Architecture Layer
Client update and network upgrade are the two main decision management mechanisms
exerted by core developers. Updating the client software to improve a centralized platform’s
design and architecture has been proved as a necessary means for platform owners to address
governance (Song et al. 2018; Tiwana et al. 2010). On a two-sided digital platform, updates often
need both complementors and users to make adaptive actions. For example, application
complementors may need to address compatibility issues with the new version, and users need to
adopt the new version to use the new functions. In an open-source development context, both
changing and maintaining the source code is done jointly by contributors and core developers
(Pereira et al. 2019). Both bugs within the code and threats to the infrastructure are dealt with
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collectively by community members (Andersen and Bogusz 2017). Although the core developer
team decides whether and when they release a new version of the client software, their decisions
are largely based on the community’s feedback and will influence the community’s behaviors.
Most blockchain platforms rely on open-source communities as a primary source of
protocol development (Chen et al. 2021). Community developers may evaluate the protocol
quality and decide whether to engage in the protocol development by observing core developers’
performance in handling feature requests. The signals associated with client updates provide
additional information about the protocol quality. Frequent updates of the blockchain client
software indicate a continuous commitment of core developers. It also suggests that the protocol
is constantly improved and adapted to the changing environment by incorporating advanced
features (Arora et al. 2006). When the perceived protocol quality is high, community
contributors will consider the chance of producing a good client software to be high and are
attracted to participate in the project (Ho and Rai 2017).
Nevertheless, it often takes time for the community developers to develop new feature
suggestions and modify the source code after each new version of the client software. As such, I
expect that a growth shock to client update will lead to increased protocol development in the
long term. In the short term, as significant revision requests have been handled in the most up-todate version, I would expect an immediate drop in the protocol development right after a client
update. In sum, I hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 3a. Client update has a negative short-term effect and a positive long-term
effect on subsequent protocol development, such that an increase shock to the release of
a new version of client software will lead to a decrease in protocol development activities
in the short term but an increase in protocol development activities in the long term.
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The increasing protocol development activities reveal the community’s growing interest
in developing the blockchain protocol. The increasing revisions and new feature suggestions also
remind the core developer team that the current version of the blockchain client software cannot
meet the community’s demand (Spaeth et al. 2015). As a response to the growing community
demand, the core developer team will be more involved in scrutinizing pull requests and update
the client software. Therefore, I expect that a client update is more likely to happen due to a
growth shock to protocol development. I also expect this feedback effect will take time to
manifest as core developers need to discuss the changes on forums or through online meetings
and arrange the new version release. However, an increase in protocol development may not
directly affect network upgrades because a code fork is more about dramatic changes in the
fundamental rules of the blockchain protocol than minor revisions to the client software (Pereira
et al. 2019).
Hypothesis 3b. Protocol development has a long-term positive effect on subsequent client
update, such that an increase shock to protocol development activities will lead to an
increase in new version release in the long term.
Network upgrade is another decision management mechanism leveraged by core
developers. It is completed by initiating a code fork. A code fork happens when irreconcilable
divergent opinions exist among blockchain’s key stakeholders (i.e.., miners, protocol
developers). A complete upgrade of the whole blockchain network makes the new and the old
versions of the underlying source code forward incompatible (Andersen and Bogusz 2017). Such
a network upgrade shows different impacts in a public blockchain ecosystem. On the one hand, a
network upgrade indicates a substantial improvement in the underlying critical rules or functions,
portraying an active and promising protocol development community. On the other hand,
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network upgrades may raise concerns regarding the hindered progress and wasted resources due
to the incompatible versions of a blockchain network, thus discouraging related future
developments (Nyman and Lindman 2013).
Network upgrades may send out an immediate negative signal to peripheral developers
interested in blockchain protocol development. One reason is that the dramatic change in the
source code may require developers to learn and adapt to the new source code before revising it.
Additionally, as the network upgrade originates from a divergence of opinions in the blockchain
development, the network version to which a developer contributes may be abandoned (if most
miners select the other network version after forking), which wastes the developer’s contribution
(Gervais et al. 2014). As such, developers may suspend their engagement after a code fork. I
expect that a network upgrade will lead to an instant drop in subsequent protocol development.
Despite the negative tones about network upgrades, developers may view the network upgrade as
an opportunity to make significant contributions to the new version of the blockchain network to
establish an individual reputation and hone protocol development skills. Further, the network
upgrade signals that the core developer team intends to improve the fundamental rules of the
blockchain protocol, which supports peripheral developers’ contributions. As such, I expect a
positive effect of network upgrades on protocol development in the long term.
Hypothesis 4. Network upgrade has a short-term negative effect and a long-term positive
effect on subsequent protocol development, such that a code fork will lead to a decrease
in protocol development activities in the short term but an increase in protocol
development activities in the long term.
As a code fork represents fundamental changes to the blockchain protocol, it often
requires follow-up updates of the client software to provide compatible support to the new
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version of the blockchain network. Code forks also require most miners’ adoption to be effective
(Andersen and Bogusz 2017; Eyal and Sirer 2014). The chain that achieves greater adoption will
remain as the main chain (Andersen and Bogusz 2017). As both development activities and
version release take time to happen, I expect the positive effect of the network upgrade on client
update to be long-term. For example, the Istanbul fork of Ethereum allows smart contracts to
introduce more creative functions, which requires new features in the client software to support
this change in the protocol. As such, I expect that there will be an increase in client update as a
response to the network update in the long term.
Hypothesis 5. Network upgrade has a long-term positive effect on subsequent client
update, such that a code fork will lead to an increase in the new version release in the
long term.
Interaction between Decision Mechanisms across Layers
I argue that the two decision mechanisms across layers also influence each other. By
definition, decision management activities relate to initiating and executing ratified decisions,
while decision control activities relate to monitoring and ratifying the upper management
initiatives (Fama and Jensen 1983). In the context of public blockchain ecosystems, miners exert
decision control rights by adjusting network capacity at the application layer, while the core
developer team exerts decision management rights by updating the client software and upgrading
the whole blockchain network. As miners’ behaviors comply with the rules specified in the
blockchain protocol, the decision control mechanism used by miners is likely to be affected by
the decision management mechanisms used by the core developer team. However, I do not
expect significant effects between network capacity adjustment and client update for two
reasons. First, adjusting the block gas limit does not necessarily require support in the form of
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new features. Second, as a new client version release only includes minor revisions to the client
software, miners may not be aware of these changes that may not directly relate to their own
interests. I argue that the interactions between governance mechanisms across layers concentrate
on the relationship between network capacity adjustment and network upgrade. I will explain
these interactions in detail below.
Network upgrade represents a radical change in the organizational structure of the
blockchain ecosystem and requires adoption by the majority of miners in order to take effect
(Andersen and Bogusz 2017; Eyal and Sirer 2014). Miners view a network upgrade as an
opportunity to gain a first-mover advantage. As the network upgrade will separate the blockchain
into two chains, the market will also split into two segments. After deciding to favor one chain
over the other, miners may take the chance to earn a greater share of verification activity (i.e.,
verifying more transactions and smart contracts) as there are fewer competitors right after a
network upgrade (Andersen and Bogusz 2017). However, the current block gas limit constrains
miners from doing so. Therefore, after the network is upgraded, miners are more likely to lift the
block gas limit to include more pending transactions and contract deployment requests into one
block to gain more monetary rewards.
Hypothesis 6a. Network upgrade has a short-term positive effect on subsequent network
capacity adjustment, such that a code fork will lead to an increase in block gas limit in
the short term.
Miners’ goal is to pursue the highest profits by being the first to solve the cryptographic
puzzle. At the same time, core developers aim to improve the blockchain protocol to increase its
competitiveness and persistence (Pereira et al. 2019). The misaligned motivations of the two
decision-making parties may result in a conflict of decisions. For one, lifting the block gas limit
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can enhance miners’ monetary rewards and broaden the use of blockchain (Andersen and Bogusz
2017). However, it also slows down the overall verification speed and makes it more challenging
to keep a copy of the expanding exchange history. Lifting the gas limit indicates that miners are
eager to reap profits at the expense of the health of the overall blockchain network, which
arouses developers’ responsibility to protect the healthy development of blockchain. As such, a
growth shock to adjusting the block gas limit upward is likely to lead to divergent opinions
regarding future blockchain development, resulting in a code fork.
Hypothesis 6b. Network capacity adjustment has a positive short-term effect on
subsequent network upgrade, such that an increase shock to block gas limit will lead to a
code fork in the short term.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Research Context and Data
I continue using Ethereum as my empirical setting and using the same dataset as my
study in Chapter 2. To be more specific, I collected the data to evaluate application layer
activities from an open dataset maintained by Google BigQuery. I also collected the data to
evaluate architecture layer activities from Ethereum’s repository on GitHub. The time span for
the data is from Week 1 in 2016 to Week 43 in 2019 (199 weeks). Consistent with the data
processing method in Chapter 2, I aggregate data at the weekly level.
Operationalization of Economic Activities. Transaction (TXN), contract deployment
(CD), mining (MN), and protocol development (PD) are measured in the same way as in the
study in Chapter 2. I measure transaction (TXN) as the total number of user-to-user transactions
and user-to-contract transactions that occur in a particular week. To measure contract
deployment (CD), I count the accumulated number of smart contracts that have been successfully
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deployed on the Ethereum blockchain in a particular week. I measure mining (MN) as the total
number of mining activities in terms of the transactions and smart contracts that are verified by
miners successfully (in real blocks) and unsuccessfully (in uncle blocks) in a particular week. I
measure protocol development (PD) as the total number of commits, which includes the
contributions by core developers and admitted pull requests from peripheral developers in a
particular week.
Operationalization of Governance Mechanisms. To examine governance mechanisms
on the two layers, I measure network capacity adjustment (NCA) using the average block gas
limit in a particular week. I measure client update (CU) using the number of client software
releases in a particular week. I use a binary indicator as the measure of network upgrade (NU),
with a value of 1 for weeks that has a code fork, and value of 0 for weeks that do not have code
forks. To address skewness in the distribution, I took the natural log of each of non-binary
endogenous variables adjusted by adding 1. Table 3 shows the definitions and summary statistics
of key variables. The average values over the observation period for network capacity
adjustment, client update, and network upgrade are 6,324,141 (unlogged), 0.4221 (unlogged),
and 0.03015, respectively.
TABLE 3
Constructs, Measures, and Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Transaction
(TXN)
Contract
Deployment
(CD)
Mining (MINE)
Protocol
Development (PD)

Measurement
Number of user-to-user transactions and
user-to-contract transactions in week t
(log)
Accumulated number of smart contracts
deployed on Ethereum by week t (log)

Mean
14.27

S.D.
1.34

Min
11.29

Max
15.93

14.11

2.33

8.80

16.78

Number of mining activities on
Ethereum in week t (log)
Number of code contributions to
Ethereum protocol on GitHub in week t
(log)

14.38

1.34

11.40

16.23

3.77

0.88

0.00

5.62
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Network Capacity
Adjustment (NCA)
Client Update (CU)

Average value of block gas limit in week
t (log)
Number of version release of the client
software in week t (log)
Network Upgrade
Whether a code fork is conducted in
(NU)
week t
Notes: N = 199. Non-binary variables are logged.

15.59

0.41

13.97

16.11

0.25

0.37

0.00

1.39

0.03

0.17

0.00

1.00

Model Specification and Estimation
As the data is time-series in nature, I employ vector autoregression (VAR) in my model
estimation. This method allows us to capture both the short-term and long-term dynamic
interdependent relationships of different activities in a blockchain ecosystem (Song et al. 2018).
Consistent with prior research and the study in Chapter 2, I adopt a standard VAR procedure
(e.g., Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999).
I use an augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test to determine whether endogenous variables
are evolving or stationary. Stationarity of endogenous variables implies that the fluctuation of the
variables caused by any unexpected changes will eventually dissipate, and these variables will
revert to their deterministic patterns without a permanent regime shift (Song et al. 2018). If the
process is not stationary, de-trending of the data can be performed in several ways, among which
differencing the data is a commonly used method (Enders 1995; Lütkepohl 2013). The ADF tests
of all endogenous variables reject the null hypothesis of a unit root and suggest stationarity after
taking the first difference (as shown in Table 4). Therefore, I examine my models using the firstdifference values of variables. In the model specification, I need to determine the appropriate
number of lags used for endogenous variables. The Akaike information criterion (AIC = -1.605)
and final prediction error (FPE = 4.8e-10) suggest that a lag of three periods (weeks) is the
optimal choice. My VAR model, therefore, includes lags of up to three weeks.
TABLE 4
Unit Root Test Results after First Differences
Variables

Test Statistic
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p-value

Transaction
Contract Deployment
Mining
Protocol Development
Network Capacity Adjustment
Client Update
Network Upgrade

-16.909
-15.234
-12.969
-22.474
-5.2756
-11.068
-5.7042

< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

The general standard reduced-form VAR(p) model with lag order p is
!! = # + %" !!#" + %$ !!#$ + ⋯ + %% !!#% + (! , * = 1, … , -

(1)

where !! = (/"! , /$! , … , /&! )' denotes an (1 × 1) vector of time series variables, including
economic activities such as transaction (-34! ), contract deployment (#5! ), mining (64! )3, and
protocol development (75! ), and decision activities such as network capacity adjustment
(4#%! ), client update (#8! ), and network upgrade (48! ). # is an (1 × 1) vector of constant
terms, %( are (1 × 1) coefficient matrices, and (! is an (1 × 1) vector of white-noise
disturbances with a normal distribution of N(0, Σ). The VAR specification given in Model (1) is
used to capture the dynamic effects of governance mechanisms in the public blockchain
ecosystem. At the application layer, the effects of decision control mechanism are reflected in
how transaction (-34! ), contract deployment (#5! ), and mining (64! ) changes over time
following a change in network capacity adjustment (4#%! ). At the architecture layer, the effects
of decision management mechanisms are reflected in how protocol development (75! ) changes
over time following a change in client update (#8! ) or network upgrade (48! ). The interactions
between governance mechanisms across layers are reflected in how network capacity adjustment

3 Although I do not hypothesize relationships between mining and network capacity adjustment, as I
expect mining would influence and be influenced by other economic activities, I include it to my VAR
model and report the results.
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(4#%! ) changes over time following a change in network upgrade (48! ), and how network
upgrade (48! ) changes over time following a change in network capacity adjustment (4#%! ).
I determine the appropriateness of using VAR based on Granger causality tests (Granger
1969). Granger causality is typically tested using Wald tests of the null hypothesis that all
coefficients of the corresponding lags are equal to zero (Enders 1995). The results in Table 5
show that there are several significant Granger-causal relationships in the estimated model that
reject the null hypothesis. Notably, for equations that have serial autocorrelation or
heteroscedasticity issues the Granger test results may not capture the potential causal
relationships accurately. As such, I also test the existence of serial correlation using BreuschGodfrey Test and heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan Test (as shown in Table 6). For
equations that have these two concerns, I refer to impulse response functions (IRFs) for more
robust results.
Impulse response functions plot the response of current and future values of variables in
the VAR model to a one-unit increase in the current value of one of the VAR error terms
(Adomavicius et al. 2012; Enders 1995). The VAR estimated coefficients are not usually directly
interpretable due to general multicollinearity issues associated with including lagged terms (Sims
1980). Therefore, I report the IRFs results in Figure 2 and use them as the basis for interpreting
the results of the model estimation.
TABLE 5
Granger Causality Test (F Statistic)
CD
CD
MN
TXN
PD
NCA
CU

–
1.202
0.443
0.136
18.756***
3.372

MN
0.298
–
2.345
3.652
6.582*
2.039

Dependent Variables
NCA
TXN
PD
5.803
4.477
2.042
42.411*** 5.019
1.820
–
6.067
0.244
3.705
–
5.536
7.492*
5.849
–
7.446*
5.262
5.537
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CU
7.714*
8.360**
8.220**
7.227*
11.103**
–

NU
0.822
0.536
0.492
1.561
37.464***
5.506

NU
3.650
6.300*
5.440
5.860
2.003
8.537**
–
Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol
Development, respectively. NCA, CU, and NU stand for Network Capacity Adjustment, Client Update,
and Network Upgrade, respectively. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

TABLE 6
Tests for Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity
Dependent Variable
Breusch-Godfrey Test
Transaction
3.006 (0.391)
Contract Deployment
4.499 (0.212)
Mining
1.523 (0.667)
Protocol Development
17.238 (0.001)
Network Capacity Adjustment
3.234 (0.357)
Client Update
12.951 (0.005)
Network Upgrade
3.063 (0.382)
Notes: The results show !! values with p-values in parentheses.
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Breusch-Pagan Test
0.020 (0.900)
1.670 (0.197)
4.620 (0.032)
4.760 (0.029)
331.670 (0.000)
4.130 (0.042)
116.350 (0.000)

FIGURE 2
Main Results—Impulse Response Functions
Effects of Network Capacity Adjustment at the Application Layer
NCA → CD (H1a)

NCA → TXN (H1b)
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Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol Development, respectively. NCA, CU, and NU
stand for Network Capacity Adjustment, Client Update, and Network Upgrade, respectively.
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FIGURE 2
Main Results—Impulse Response Functions (continued)
Effects of Client Update and Network Upgrade at the Architecture Layer
CU → PD (H3a)
NU → PD (H4)
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Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol Development, respectively. NCA, CU, and NU
stand for Network Capacity Adjustment, Client Update, and Network Upgrade, respectively.
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RESULTS
My goal in this study is to (1) identify three governance mechanisms in a public
blockchain ecosystem, and (2) examine how each mechanism influences other economic
activities at two ecosystem layers. I also explore the interaction between mechanisms. This study
considers a short-term effect as the response in growth of one type of activity (decision activity
or economic activity) within the first four weeks after a growth shock to another type of activity.
Likewise, I consider a long-term effect as the growth of one type of activity to the growth of
another type of activity after four weeks. The estimated model coefficients can be found in
Appendix A. Figure 3 provides a reduced form of the research model as uncovered by Granger
causality analysis and IRFs analysis.
FIGURE 3
Reduced Form of Research Model
Contract
Deployment

Network Capacity
Adjustment

Transaction
Application Layer
Architecture Layer
Network
Upgrade

Client Update

Protocol
Development

Main Results
Effects of decision control mechanism at the application layer. The Granger causality
results in Table 5 indicate significant effects of network capacity adjustment on contract
deployment and transaction, respectively. Figure 2 corroborates the results and shows that
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network capacity adjustment has a short-term negative effect on contract deployment (in week 2
and week 3), supporting Hypothesis 1a. I also find a positive influence of network capacity
adjustment on contract deployment at week 4. It is possible that when miners’ ability to verify
more pending requests is increased by upgrading their mining facilities, contract creators are
motivated to participate as they would expect growth of transactions along with the increased
network capacity. According to the IRF graph, network capacity adjustment does not
significantly affect transaction. Hypothesis 1b is not supported. This result suggests that users
may care less about miners’ decision control behaviors. One reason could be that the benefits
incurred by increased network capacity (e.g., reduced transaction fee) is not attractive enough to
encourage user participation. Users’ transaction behaviors may be tied to other factors. For
example, when the blockchain ecosystem has accumulated a large user base and built strong
network effects, users may find it challenging to find alternative blockchain platforms.
Contrary to my Hypotheses 2a and 2b, the IRF graphs do not show significant feedback
effects from contract deployment or transaction to network capacity adjustment. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b are not supported. The results suggest that miners’ decision
control activities are not shaped by users’ and contract creators’ activities.
Effects of decision management mechanisms at the architecture layer. Although the
Granger test results indicate that neither client update nor network upgrade has causal
relationships with protocol development, the IRF graphs reveal significant effects after correcting
for issues with serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Specifically, the IRF graph in Figure 2
shows that client update has a negative short-term effect on protocol development (at week 1)
and a positive long-term effect on protocol development (at week 14). Hypothesis 3a is
supported. The results suggest that updates of the client software help to attract code commits in
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the long term. A similar pattern is shown in the relationship between network upgrade and
protocol development. However, the influence of network upgrade on protocol development is
more dynamic than theorized. Network upgrade affects protocol development negatively at
weeks 1, 4, 7, and 19, while the effects turn positive at weeks 2 and 16. As such, Hypothesis 4 is
partially supported. The results suggest that the effects of the decision management mechanism
in terms of network upgrade are complex. It may be because the aspects of the blockchain
protocol that are fundamentally changed require a different amount of code contribution at a later
stage. Compared to the changes that are proposed the first time, the ones that were previously
undertaken may require less effort in protocol development.
As a feedback effect, the influence of protocol development on client update is immediate
and negative, which contradicts the long-term positive effect in Hypothesis 3b. A plausible
reason for the short-term negative effect is that a growth shock to protocol development may
suggest the core developers postpone the release and reconsider which new features should be
included in the next version. The non-significant effect reveals that core developers’ decisions on
new version release in the long term do not rely on the number of protocol development
activities in previous periods.
Network upgrade shows dynamic effects on client update. The effects are positive at
weeks 11 and 16 but negative at weeks 10, 15, and 17. As such, Hypothesis 5 is not supported.
Interaction between of governance mechanisms across layers. The IRF graphs in Figure
2 indicate that the effect of network upgrade on network capacity adjustment is non-significant
(Row 4, Column 2). Thus, Hypothesis 6a is not supported. It means that the miners’ decision
control activities are not affected by core developers’ decision management activities. However,
the decision control activities dynamically influence decision management activities.
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Specifically, network capacity adjustment affects network upgrade positively at week 3. Then
the effects become negative at weeks 4, 7, and 9 (Row 4, Column 3). Hypothesis 6b is supported.
Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses
I conduct two additional analyses to verify the robustness of my results. First, I use the
drastic change in the average block gas limit to measure network capacity adjustment (NCA). An
alternative explanation for the insignificant relationship between NCA and transaction could be
that users are not aware of the gas limit change within a relatively small range. Increasing or
decreasing the average block limit to another level (i.e., the change >= 1 million in Ethereum)
may attract users’ attention. To test the influence of NCA using the alternative measurement, I
calculate the change in average block gas limit and assign a value of 1 for weeks that have a
drastic change in the average block gas limit and a value of 0 for weeks that do not. I rerun the
VAR model. The results are summarized in Appendix B. Interestingly, according to the IRF
graph in Figure B, I find that the drastic change of network capacity adjustment has a positive
short-term effect on contract deployment, which is contrary to my main results. A plausible
explanation is that compared to granular changes in the network capacity, a significant change
may boost contract creators’ confidence in the ecosystem’s capability of handling more
exchanges and attracting more users. A drastic change of the network capacity also negatively
affects transactions in the short term. This result suggests that users worry more about the
extended waiting time that would affect their transactions than the saved transaction fees when
there is a drastic change in network capacity. I also find significant and negative long-term
effects of network upgrade on network capacity adjustment, while there is no significant effect in
return. The results are reasonable if I think of it from the objective of network upgrade in terms
of resolving divergent opinions. After each network upgrade, miners who hold the same opinions
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will stay on the same chain. In the long term, they may feel less necessary to change the average
gas limit dramatically.
Second, I try alternative measures that characterize the participant engagement at two
layers. I collect additional data on unique number of users, miners, contract creators, and
protocol developers, respectively. Specifically, I use unique user (UU) as an alternative measure
for transaction, unique contract creator (UC) as an alternative measure for contract deployment,
unique miner (UM) as an alternative measure for mining, and unique developer (UD) as an
alternative measure for protocol development. I rerun the VAR model with these new measures.
The results, as summarized in Appendix C, are qualitatively consistent with the main results. I
find that although network capacity adjustment has a short-term negative effect on contract
deployment, its impacts on unique contract creator are long-term and tend to be negative (at
Weeks 6, 8, 13, and 15). The results suggest that an increase in network capacity adjustment
leads to a drop in contract deployment activities shortly and gradually turns out to decrease the
number of distinct contract creators. I also find long-term positive effects of network capacity
adjustment on unique user at Week 7 and Week 10, which supports Hypothesis 1b.
DISCUSSION
In this research, I sought to understand the specific decentralized governance mechanisms
exerted by different parties of participants in a public blockchain ecosystem. Drawing on the
ecosystem’s layered structure and Fama and Jensen’s (1983) framework of decision processes, I
conceptualized network capacity adjustment as the decision control mechanism at the application
layer and client update and network upgrade as decision management mechanisms at the
architecture layer. Then, I examined the dynamic effects of these governance mechanisms on
economic activities and the interactions between mechanisms.

108

The longitudinal empirical study provides unique insights into the governance of a highly
decentralized platform-enabled ecosystem. At the application layer, the results show that a lift of
network capacity affects contract deployment activities but does not influence transaction
activities. I also find that miners do not rely on economic activities at the application layer to
exert the decision control mechanism. At the architecture layer, my results indicate that both
decision management mechanisms significantly affect protocol development. Network upgrade
also influences client update, while no feedback effect is found on network upgrade. The crosslayer results indicate that although miners follow the rules defined in the blockchain protocol, the
decision control mechanism is not affected by decision management mechanisms. Instead, core
developers would reflect on the feedback of the decision control mechanism to exert the decision
management mechanism.
Theoretical Implications
This research makes several research contributions. First, my research contributes to the
platform-enabled ecosystem literature by focusing on decentralized governance that has been
previously understudied. The extant studies have concentrated on the governance of centralized
ecosystems while paying less attention to highly decentralized ecosystems (Chen et al. 2021).
Compared to centralized ecosystem governance, the lack of a central authority increases the
difficulty of reaching consensus in highly decentralized ecosystems. Residing in the context of
public blockchain ecosystems, I introduce a two-layer structure that decomposes a complex
ecosystem into self-contained yet interdependent layers. The layered structure of ecosystems set
a basis for understanding decentralized forms of governance in a multi-side and cross-platform
ecosystem.
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Second, I extend Fama and Jensen’s (1983) two types of decision activities and
conceptualize decision control mechanism and decision management mechanism in the context
of public blockchain ecosystems. Prior literature has investigated how centralized organizations
exert decision control and decision management activities. My study extends the prior literature
by investigating decision mechanisms in a highly decentralized ecosystem and how these
mechanisms influence other economic activities. As decision-making authority is distributed to a
wide range of participants, the mechanisms that decision-makers carry out to govern a
decentralized ecosystem can be fundamentally different from those in a centralized organization.
First, exercising the decision control mechanism is an individual miner’s behavior rather than a
collective behavior. However, individual miners’ common vision about acquiring mining
rewards brings about the same solution (exercise of decision control mechanism) with other
miners (Hayek 1945). My conceptualization of decision control in decentralized ecosystems
offers a unique angle for understanding highly decentralized governance. Second, the impacts of
decision mechanisms in the public blockchain ecosystem are dynamic due to highly
decentralized governance. My results show that different parties of participants respond to
decision mechanisms differently in different time periods, which provides insight for
understanding the influence of decentralized governance at a more granular level.
Finally, my research contributes to the blockchain literature by empirically examining the
influence of three decision mechanisms, while previous literature studies blockchain governance
from a theoretical perspective (Chen et al. 2021). My research also responds to previous
literature’s call for research on allocating decision rights in the blockchain economy (Beck et al.
2018). Specifically, I identify three specific decision mechanisms that govern the public
blockchain at different layers and examine the influences of each mechanism on other economic
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activities. I also explore the interaction between decision mechanisms across layers. The results
provide insights for future studies on blockchain governance design.
Practical Implications
I suggest that core developers should be cautious of using network upgrade. According to
my results, network upgrade has significant relationships with protocol development and other
decision mechanisms such as client update and network capacity adjustment. However, the
valence of these relationships fluctuates over time, which means the influence of enacting
network upgrade remains unclear. On the one hand, initiating a network upgrade can revise the
underlying rules in the blockchain protocol and resolve stakeholders’ divergent opinions. On the
other hand, network upgrades can cause a decrease in the community size, which may negatively
impact the token valuation and the reputation (Pereira et al. 2019).
My results also provide insights to organizations that are interested in adopting a
decentralized form of governance supported by blockchain technologies. The three decision
mechanisms I identify at the two layers of the blockchain ecosystem is a good starting point for
organizations to consider their governance design. For example, as increasing the network
capacity shows long-term positive effects on contract deployment, blockchain ecosystems whose
priority is to scale the base of complementors may consider providing miners more flexibility in
exerting the decision control mechanism.
Limitation and Future Research
This research has some limitations and creates potential directions for future research.
First, this research focuses on the public blockchain in a specific empirical setting. My decision
to focus on a public blockchain ecosystem was informed by the research objective of
investigating the highly decentralized governance of an ecosystem. Future studies may consider
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expanding insights by examining other blockchain ecosystems, such as private blockchain
ecosystems and consortium blockchain ecosystems.
Second, this research focuses on a specific blockchain ecosystem to understand the
dynamic influences of different decentralized governance mechanisms on other activities in the
ecosystem. Another pertinent and exciting topic is exploring how various degrees of
decentralization of decision-making power would affect an ecosystem’s functioning. Future
studies may collect data about multiple blockchain ecosystems to examine the role of
decentralization degree.
Finally, although my research pinpoints the fluctuating influences of decision
management mechanisms on the decision control mechanism and other economic activities, I are
unable to explore specific mechanism features that might cause such differentiation due to the
restriction of the dataset. Future studies may consider collecting data from multiple blockchain
ecosystems and using the panel vector autoregression (PVAR) method to conduct a more indepth analysis.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, I report the public blockchain ecosystem governance as consisting of
three decision mechanisms: network capacity adjustment as the decision control mechanism at
the application layer, and client update and network upgrade as decision management
mechanisms at the architecture layer. My results demonstrate the dynamic effects of decision
mechanisms on other activities in the ecosystem. The results also reveal interaction effects
between mechanisms. Overall, my findings provide empirical evidence of how decentralized
governance is enacted in a digital platform-enabled ecosystem.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1
VAR Results – Application Layer
CD
-0.174** (0.072)
-0.208*** (0.070)
-0.209*** (0.071)
-0.073 (0.603)
0.247 (0.663)
0.668 (0.620)
0.259 (0.509)
-0.049 (0.581)
-0.003 (0.502)
0.011 (0.050)
0.014 (0.057)

Dependent Variables
MN
TXN
0.002 (0.140)
0.015 (0.016)
0.007 (0.136)
0.034** (0.015)
0.001 (0.014)
0.017 (0.016)
0.235** (0.118)
0.846*** (0.133)
0.126 (0.129)
0.409*** (0.146)
0.027 (0.121)
0.202 (0.136)
-0.145 (0.099)
-0.799*** (0.112)
-0.062 (0.113)
-0.432*** (0.128)
0.009 (0.098)
-0.168 (0.110)
0.003 (0.010)
-0.001 (0.011)
0.019* (0.011)
0.019 (0.013)

NCA
-0.002 (0.010)
0.009 (0.010)
0.010 (0.010)
0.007 (0.082)
-0.052 (0.090)
0.085 (0.084)
0.019 (0.069)
0.001 (0.079)
-0.023 (0.069)
0.008 (0.007)
0.018** (0.008)

CD!"#
CD!"$
CD!"%
MN!"#
MN!"$
MN&"%
TXN&"#
TXN&"$
TXN&"%
PD&"#
PD!"$
PD!"%
-0.005 (0.052)
0.008 (0.010)
0.004 (0.011)
0.008 (0.007)
-0.110 (0.105)
-0.034 (0.119)
0.381*** (0.073)
NCA!"# -1.718*** (0.539)
NCA!"$ -0.872 (0.591)
0.295*** (0.115)
0.338*** (0.130)
0.050 (0.080)
-0.813 (0.108)
-0.164 (0.122)
-0.103 (0.075)
NCA!"% 0.779 (0.554)
Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol
Development, respectively. NCA, CU, and NU stand for Network Capacity Adjustment, Client Update,
and Network Upgrade, respectively. N = 199. Variables are logged. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively.

TABLE A2
VAR Results – Architecture Layer
Dependent Variables
PD
CU
NU
-0.631*** (0.083)
0.087** (0.036)
0.012 (0.014)
PD&"#
PD!"$
-0.394*** (0.095)
0.031 (0.042)
0.001 (0.017)
-0.214** (0.087)
-0.015 (0.038)
0.011 (0.015)
PD!"%
CU!"#
-0.394** (0.189)
-0.973*** (0.083)
0.058* (0.033)
-0.401* (0.236)
-0.553*** (0.104)
0.078* (0.041)
CU!"$
CU!"%
-0.297 (0.192)
-0.219** (0.084)
0.008 (0.033)
-0.445 (0.408)
-0.500*** (0.179)
0.051 (0.071)
NU!"#
NU!"$
-0.806* (0.413)
-0.165 (0.181)
-0.041 (0.072)
0.362 (0.412)
-0.024 (0.181)
0.044 (0.072)
NU!"%
Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol
Development, respectively. NCA, CU, and NU stand for Network Capacity Adjustment, Client Update,
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and Network Upgrade, respectively. N = 199. Variables are logged. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively.

TABLE A3
VAR Results – Cross Layers
Dependent Variables
NCA
NU
NCA!"# 0.381*** (0.073)
-0.177 (0.156)
0.700*** (0.172)
NCA!"$ 0.050 (0.080)
NCA!"% -0.103 (0.075)
-0.908*** (0.161)
0.045 (0.033)
0.051 (0.071)
NU!"#
NU!"$
-0.010 (0.034)
-0.041 (0.072)
-0.011 (0.034)
0.044 (0.072)
NU!"%
Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol
Development, respectively. NCA, CU, and NU stand for Network Capacity Adjustment, Client Update,
and Network Upgrade, respectively. N = 199. Variables are logged. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively.

TABLE A4
Model Fitness
Equation
Contract Deployment (CD)
Mining (MN)
Transaction (TXN)

R square
0.2354
0.0927
0.3013

Protocol Development (PD)

0.4283

Network Capacity Adjustment (NCA)
Client Update (CU)
Network Upgrade (NU)

0.2238
0.5474
0.2170
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APPENDIX B
Robustness Check: Using Drastic Change as Network Capacity Adjustment
TABLE B1
Granger Causality Test (Drastic Change as NCA)
Dependent Variables
NCA
CU
NU
MN
TXN
PD
CD
–
0.595
6.262
4.799
2.212
11.458*** 1.645
1.888
–
40.682*** 5.625
1.692
7.557*
0.479
MN
1.149
2.395
–
5.365
0.838
7.591*
0.275
TXN
PD
0.651
2.837
2.843
–
3.560
7.819**
2.809
NCA
37.301*** 7.680*
8.799**
7.455*
–
5.620
6.945*
CU
2.911
1.789
6.909*
4.958
7.304*
–
4.940
4.084
5.509
4.071
7.680*
0.380
10.300**
–
NU
Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol
Development, respectively. NCA, CU, and NU stand for Network Capacity Adjustment, Client Update,
and Network Upgrade, respectively. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
CD

TABLE B2
Tests for Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity
Dependent Variable
Breusch-Godfrey Test
Transaction
3.206 (0.361)
Contract Deployment
3.386 (0.336)
Mining
4.348 (0.226)
Protocol Development
10.494 (0.015)
Network Capacity Adjustment
2.608 (0.456)
Client Update
16.849 (0.001)
Network Upgrade
14.028 (0.003)
Notes: The results show *' values with p-values in parentheses.
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Breusch-Pagan Test
0.020 (0.897)
17.430 (0.000)
4.770 (0.029)
3.600 (0.058)
213.120 (0.000)
2.870 (0.090)
252.170 (0.000)

FIGURE B
Impulse Response Functions (Drastic Change as NCA)
Effects of Network Capacity Adjustment on the Application Layer
NCA → CD (H1a)

NCA → TXN (H1b)
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Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol Development, respectively. NCA, CU, and NU
stand for Network Capacity Adjustment, Client Update, and Network Upgrade, respectively.
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FIGURE B (Continued)
Impulse Response Functions (Drastic Change as NCA)
Effects of Client Update and Network Upgrade on the Architecture Layer
CU → PD (H3a)
NU → PD (H4)
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Notes: CD, MN, TXN, and PD stand for Contract Deployment, Mining, Transaction, and Protocol Development, respectively. NCA, CU, and NU
stand for Network Capacity Adjustment, Client Update, and Network Upgrade, respectively.
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APPENDIX C
Robustness Check: Using Unique Number of Participants
TABLE C1
Granger Causality Test (Unique Number of Participants)
Dependent Variables
NCA
CU
NU
UM
UU
UD
UC
–
2.308
3.606
7.354*
2.842
12.027*** 2.088
2.279
–
2.018
6.691*
1.396
1.598
1.207
UM
7.383*
3.824
–
4.640
2.194
3.205
0.875
UU
UD
0.764
2.773
3.101
–
3.610
3.386
0.963
NCA
0.829
0.573
3.095
5.925
–
17.419*** 32.77***
CU
5.040
2.100
4.096
3.812
4.984
–
6.794*
3.876
3.181
5.394
2.396
2.476
9.153**
–
NU
Notes: UC, UM, UU, and UD stand for Unique Contract Creator, Unique Miner, Unique User, and
Unique Developer, respectively. NCA, CU, and NU stand for Network Capacity Adjustment, Client
Update, and Network Upgrade, respectively. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
UC

TABLE C2
Tests for Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity
Dependent Variable
Breusch-Godfrey Test
Unique User
4.660 (0.199)
Unique Creator
5.092 (0.165)
Unique Miner
1.352 (0.717)
Unique Developer
20.675 (0.000)
Network Capacity Adjustment
5.381 (0.146)
Client Update
13.911 (0.003)
Network Upgrade
3.269 (0.352)
!
Notes: The results show ! values with p-values in parentheses.
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Breusch-Pagan Test
4.820 (0.028)
0.180 (0.668)
1.290 (0.255)
2.05 (0.153)
309.410 (0.000)
3.710 (0.054)
119.39 (0.000)

FIGURE C
Impulse Response Functions (Unique Number of Participants)
Effects of Network Capacity Adjustment on the Application Layer
NCA → UC (H1a)
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Notes: UC, UM, UU, and UD stand for Unique Contract Creator, Unique Miner, Unique User, and Unique Developer, respectively. NCA, CU,
and NU stand for Network Capacity Adjustment, Client Update, and Network Upgrade, respectively.
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FIGURE C (Continued)
Impulse Response Functions (Unique Number of Participants)
Effects of Client Update and Network Upgrade on the Architecture Layer
CU → UD (H3a)
NU → UD (H4)
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Notes: UC, UM, UU, and UD stand for Unique Contract Creator, Unique Miner, Unique User, and Unique Developer, respectively. NCA, CU,
and NU stand for Network Capacity Adjustment, Client Update, and Network Upgrade, respectively.
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION
The objective of this dissertation was to understand decentralized platform-enabled
ecosystems from two perspectives. From the value co-creation perspective, this dissertation
investigates how interdependent activities facilitate network effects in public blockchain
ecosystems. From the governance perspective, this dissertation explores how decentralized
governance mechanisms influence these activities. This dissertation was motivated by the newly
emergent form of highly decentralized ecosystems and the lack of knowledge about the
mechanisms through which decentralized governance is enacted. I proposed a layer-subsystem
structure to decompose a complex ecosystem with multiple sides of participants into two layers
and three subsystems: the contract subsystem and exchange subsystem at the application layer
and protocol subsystem at the architecture layer. Drawing on the theoretical lens of value cocreation, I found that network effects within subsystems are direct and can manifest immediately.
In contrast, the network effects between subsystems are indirect and can be short-term or longterm at a layer but are more likely to be long-term across layers.
Enlightened by the findings, I took a step further to explore the decentralized governance
mechanisms in the public blockchain ecosystem and how they impact the activities at each layer.
I extended the two types of decision activities to the public blockchain ecosystem context and
conceptualized two decision mechanisms. Specifically, I identified network capacity adjustment
as the decision control mechanism at the application layer and client update and network upgrade
as two decision management mechanisms at the architecture layer. I empirically examined my
research model and found significant influences of each decision mechanism on other activities
at the same layer. My results also identified a feedback effect from activities to client update at
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the architecture layer. In addition, I found that the decision control mechanism has a cross-layer
impact on the decision management mechanism. Figure 1 provides a summary of findings.
FIGURE 1
Conceptual Framework
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This dissertation makes critical theoretical implications that can guide future research on
platform-enabled ecosystems and decentralized governance. First, this dissertation contributes to
the literature on platform-enabled ecosystems with a specific focus on decentralized ecosystems
underexplored by prior literature. I identify the distinctiveness of decentralized ecosystems and
stress the importance of understanding how network effects are generated in such ecosystems.
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Future research can continue to study topics in this research stream, such as investigating various
decentralization degrees of governance on network effects in the ecosystem. Second, the layersubsystem structure decomposes a complex platform-enabled ecosystem into self-contained but
interrelated components. It provides insights into how value co-creation activities generate
network effects in the ecosystem. Future studies can build on this structure and extend it into
other types of platform-enabled ecosystems. Third, the two classes of decision mechanisms
provide a framework for understanding the decentralized governance of a complex ecosystem.
Future studies may continue to identify and examine other mechanisms that fall into these two
classes. Finally, this dissertation contributes to the blockchain literature by studying blockchain
ecosystems from a managerial perspective and empirically examining the influence of
decentralized governance mechanisms. Future studies could invest in the overall governance
design or improving the existing governance mechanisms to make the blockchain ecosystem
more synergistic and self-organized.
I believe that the research streams on decentralized governance and decentralized
ecosystems are very promising, especially considering that many people’s work has permanently
transformed into a remote mode due to the global pandemic caused by Covid-19. Despite the
excitement about decentralized governance supported by blockchain technologies, I should
acknowledge that decentralized ecosystems and their governance are still at an early stage of
exploration. Governance mechanisms need to be well designed to fit into specific organizational
contexts. The impacts of these mechanisms also need to be carefully evaluated before an
organization decides to adopt blockchain technologies.
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